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Introduction 
Welcome to Undercurrents. The papers in this year's volume converge on the 
theme of the representation and domination of Nature in Western culture. This 
theme reflects on the problem of how representational thinking, in the form of 
language, ideology, beliefs, or technology, mediates and filters the experience of 
the relationships between humans and the rest of Nature. When re-presented, 
Nature becomes separated, bounded and objectified, and therefore gives itself up 
as an object for domination. 
To begin this issue, Mark Meisner explores some of the historical 
relationships of language forms to human perceptions of Nature. He attempts to 
reconstruct the changes in language from oral to literal forms, and explains how 
the printed word has lent itself to the reification of Nature. Next, in his paper, 
Darryl Lee deconstructs the dominant conceptualization of the ecological crisis 
using it as a mirror of our own social condition. As such, he maintains that in 
ordet to come to terms with our current relation to Nature, we must first untangle 
the myths and language that surround it. Working on an ironic analysis of the 
better bathroom as a surrogate for the experience of Nature, Andrew Sattherwaite 
helps us to understand how we reconstruct and therefore distance Nature by 
representing it in this cultural form. Using the example of 'animal war heros,' 
Gary Genosko examines the anthropocentric bias inherent in how we 
anthropomorphize animals. Although perhaps unavoidable, Gary argues that we 
should aim to be more critical of our anthropomorphic relations with nonhumans. 
In her paper, Margot La Rocque offers some criticisms on the idea and practice 
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of wildlife cinematography. She argues that instead of helping to preserve wild 
Nature, this genre merely records and represents wilderness, thereby transforming 
it into an object of manipulation for and by a consuming public. Craig 
Naherniak's paper uses the example of biotechnology to caution us against the 
paradox inherent in domestication. The paradox lies in that in attempting to 
dominate Nature, through its re-presentation as material for technological 
manipulation, the technology of domestication, in turn, threatens to 'engulf' and 
dominate humankind as well. Finally, through the example of modern forestry 
practices, rolf struthers creatively challenges the danger inherent in 
representational and technological mode$ of thinking. 
Each of these papers, on their own, embrace the theme of this particular 
volume, and the mandate of the journal in general. Despite this, the selection of 
this year's· papers was, nonetheless, a difficult task. In previous volumes, the 
editors felt that the process involved in publishing Undercurrents was significant 
to the social vision we wished to articulate. It was decided, therefore, that a 
discussion of the process be included in the introduction. This year, the emphasis 
on process was no different; indeed, at times it seemed to take precedent over the 
more 'pragmatic' function of actually putting this volume together. Ideally, 
process concerns are shared, and understood to carry a weight equal to that of 
publishing. In our process we aim to operate without any hierarchy of 
responsibilities and on the basis of group consensus in decision making. These 
principles however seemed to engender their own set of problems. Without an 
editor-in-chief, incongruities associated with normal functioning can become 
intensified. Without a fully articulated framework in place to deal with 
discordances, we spent much time deliberating on the appropriateness of style and 
content of each paper. Though it was often tense and difficult, the editors felt 
that the process should not be compromised. With this volume, we believe that 
we have succeeded in publishing Undercurrents while at the same time working 
toward our desired forms of organization and decision making. 
We would like to thank a number of people who in different ways contributed 
to the publication of this year's volume. First of all, we would like to extend our 
appreciation to all of our funding sources, including the Faculty of Environmental 
Studies, the Faculty of Graduate Studies, the Graduate Student Association and 
the Environmental Studies Students Assoc. Also, we would like to thank our 
printers, the people at Our Times, Anita McBride for her continued support and 
Frances Chan for her computer expertise. We look forward to a continued 
friendship with all of you. 
Of course, we would like to thank you for reading Undercurrents. In the 
past, we have received letters of support and criticism from some of our readers: 
your thoughts help guide our vision of what is relevant and accessible to activists 
and scholars alike. We would like to hear from other voices across the country. 
Graduate students interested in contributing to Undercurrents should consult the 
editorial policy in the inside back cover. 
We hope that you enjoy this issue. Please tell your friends and colleagues 
about us. 
The Editors 
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Words And Worlds: 
Language and the Perceived Separation of Humans From Nature 
Introduction 
· Cultural representations· of the world permeate 
much of human experience of that world. In this 
society, it seems increasingly unlikely that there can 
be experience that is not somehow overlaid by 
. representation. Under such circumstances, it is our 
forms of representation that have the greatest impact 
on how we understand, give meaning to, and value 
this place in which we live. Perhaps the most 
significant of those forms is language1 for it is both · the most pervasive and the one through which the 
others are most often interpreted. 
Given its 'centrality in our lives, it is nQt 
surprising that "language" is often deemed to be 
what distinguishes humans from the rest of Nature. 
What is meant by this assertion seems to be that 
humans have "language" whereas other species do 
not, and this somehow makes us exceptional and 
·superior. While I disagree with both the logic and 
the implications of this claim, it suggests a curious 
irony. that I would like to explore in this paper.' · 
That irony is in the prospect of a relationship 
between human language and the type of worldview 
that would lead us to believe that somehow our 
language makes us an exceptional species. 
. This paper, then, is an enquiry into another 
sense in which language "distinguishes" humans 
from Nature, namely the· possibility that, in the 
West, it has historically contributed to the increas-
ing human perception of separation from, and 
· domination of, non-human Nature. In other words, 
I would like to explore how historical changes in 
the form of language (ie. speech, writing, print- . 
ing), by shifting human consciousness2 away from 
immediate experience and into a linear world of 
symbolic representation, may have resulted in an 
intensification of the belief that humans are separate 
· from, and able · to control Nature. In turn, those 
changes made possible . certain uses of language, 
·uses which, in enabling a measure ·of actual control · 
over aspects of Nature1 may have had the effect of reinforcing this belief. . 
•••• 
by Mark Meisner· 
When I say language, I simply mean words 
and ways of combining them. However, language 
must · be understood as more than just that. It is a 
way of, and a capacity for, symbolically represent-
ing experiences, things and phenomena. But, lan-
guage does not simply re-present; it also helps to 
shape and give meaning to our experiences. In other 
words, language is not a neutral set of labels for 
describing the world in objective terms. Rather, 
because it is ·imbued with cultural assumptions and 
values, with ·connotations as well as denotations, 
with multiple meanings and ambiguities, and with 
particular ways of seeing the world, language is an 
active element of perception. 
To understand this, we need to understand the 
idea that realities are multiple and constructed; 
there is no one "objective" reality. What we take .as 
reality, and assume to be independent of our per-
ceptions; is actually more of a product of the 
interactions of our experience of the physical a~d 
social world with the conceptual and ideological 
· artifacts that we bear. However, in general, humans 
in the West tend to think of reality as objective, and 
this is largely because of language, as Peter Berger 
and Thomas Luckmann explain: 
I apprehend the reality of everyday life as an 
. ordered reality. lts phenomena are prearranged 
in patterns· that seem to be independent of my 
apprehension of them and that impose them-
selves upon the latter. The reality of everyday 
life appears already objectified, that is, consti-
.tuted by an order of objects that have been 
designated as objects before my appearance on 
the scene. The language used in everyday life 
continuously provides me with the necessary 
objectifications and posits . the order within 
which these make sense and within which 
everyday life has meaning for me.• 
In this way, language becomes . a sort of impercep-
tible lens through which the world is understood, 
and not simply a neutral means by which we de-
scribe, communicate and gi:ve meaning to our 
experiences.5 Thus, in moving from the domain of 
pure experience (if there is such a thing) into the 
·Mark Meisner is an environmentalthoughl student aJ York University and is presently writing his Master's thesis on language and 
naJure. He thanks members of the editorial board for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper . 
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domain of representation of that experience through 
language, we begin to "construct" reality. 
While this paper does not, for the most part, 
address the content of language, or the ways in 
which words and grammar work upon u·s, this 
concept of the social construction of reality is 
nevertheless significant. This is so because the form 
that language takes also affects how it works and 
what we are able to do with it. The form of lan-
guage has a relationship to the way in which the 
world is perceived through it, as I will suggest in 
this paper. "Reality," for people living in oral 
cultures, is different from "reality" for people 
living in literate cultures, and in part, this "is be-
cause the form of language is different. . 
So, in order to better understand human 
relationships with non-human Nature, it seems 
sensible to explore the possible links between the 
changing form of language and the increasingly 
abstract and detached view of Nature which now 
characterizes Western industrial society and which 
lends itself to a growing human imperialism towards 
non-human Nature. However, in this paper I will be 
highlighting one particular interpretation of lan-
guage, namely its disjunctive characteristics.' 
Furthermore, I will be emphasizing language as a 
general capacity for communication and action, in 
its different forms, as distinguished from (but not 
unrelated to) the uses that are made of language or 
language behaviour .7 
The Beginnings of Language 
It is impossible to say exactly where, when or 
how language as such emerged. In all likelihood it 
was neither an isolated nor a clearly identifiable 
event. Language has been changing, and when the 
sounds and gestures of prehistoric peoples became 
a language is a matter of speculation. What is 
interesting to ask is whether the advent of spoken 
language may have influenced human perceptions 
of, and relationships with, non-human Nature. 
In Technics and Human Development 
Lewis Mumford suggests that in the absence of 
language there is a significance to the world such 
that "the concrete experience of every animal 
including man [sic] 'makes sense' without the 
intervention of symbols, if the creature is· alert and 
responsive."' In this way humans already lived in a 
meaningful environment prior to the establishment 
of language. Things, beings and phenomena were 
what experience of them said they were. There may 
not have been the symbols, or the possibility for 
discussing experience, but there was some form of 
experiential meaning. 
It is thought that. prior to the advent of spoken 
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language, humans acted out gestures in the repeated 
context of events in such ways that the gestures 
eventually took on symbolic meaning; they became 
rituals. It is most likely from the symbolism of such 
rituals, including those between mother and child 
and those of the hunt, that language eventually 
emerged. What type of language emerged at that 
time is unknown. Andree Collard feels that the 
"collective nurturing and the play element involved 
in the caring of the young is likely to create a 
language rich in emotional nuances and a vocabu-
lary far more imaginative, complex, and .affective 
than the language derived from the hunt. "9 What 
she seems to mean by this is that the act of nurtur-
ing and caring would seem to promote a more 
relational and evocative language, whereas the act 
of hunting would promote more of an instrumental, 
control-oriented language. Given the type of lan-
guage we in the West have today, it is quite pos-
sible that the hunting-oriented version largely 
crowded out the nurturing version. 
From the beginning, language helped humans 
to express the meanings they felt in their existence 
and experience. However, according to Mumford, 
it was also used in "the disciplining of the uncon-
scious, the establishment of a coherent and stable 
social order, [and] the perfection of the social 
bond, "10 all of which may be seen as part of the 
process of human self-domestication, or of distan-
cing ourselves from the world of Nature." Further-
more, according to Mumford, language created a 
symbolic world that was more compelling than the 
world it was attempting to model. "The world that 
was symbolically organized, mainly in language, 
became more significant, more essential to all 
specifically human activities, than the raw 'outer' 
world mutely taken in bl' the senses, or the private 
inner world of dream."' 
Early language also allowed for the creation 
of new ideas and situations in the mind, simply 
through the use of symbols: 
That abstract sounds could bring to mind actual 
people, concrete places and objects, was the 
fundamental magic property of speech: but there 
was even more potent magic in the fact that 
these same or similar sounds, differently organ-
ized, might bring into the mind events that had 
ceased, or project entirely new experiences." 
In this way, part of the magic of words was to 
transform human perceptions of the world in such 
a way that it gave the impression that, through 
language, humans could control aspects of their 
environment. 
To understand this, we need to consider the 
centrality of myths in oral cultures. Myths were a 
vital part of the meaning frameworks of early 
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human societies, and language was the principal 
medium through which myths were created and 
passed on. In discussing the work of Ernst Cassirer, 
Harold Innis · suggests the following relationship of 
lapguage, myth and thought: 
Mythology reflected' the power exercised by 
language on thought. The word became a pri-
mary force in which all being and doing orig-
inate. Verbal structures appeared as mythical 
entities endowed with mythical powers.1' 
In particular, myths could be used to serve as a 
source of power "over" Nature, as suggested by 
Mircea Eliade: 
We sec, then, that the "story" narrated by the 
myth constitutes a "knowledge" which is eso-
teric, not only because it is secret and is handed 
on during the course of an initiation but also 
because the "knowledge" is accompanied by a 
magico-religious power. For knowing the origin 
of an object, and animal, a plant and so on is 
equivalent to acquiring a magical power over 
them by which they can be controlled, multi-
plied, or reproduced at will.u 
In addition to the possibility that the advent 
of language changed human perceptions of the 
world, with its refinement, early humans we're able 
to use language in an instrumental way to actually 
affect the physical world. For example; language 
permitted early hunters to strategize and coordinate 
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with each other, thereby improving their effective-
ness. It was also refined by those who did the food 
gathering, for that was an activity that required 
identification by naming}6 "Oral peoples commonly 
think of names (one kind of words) as conveying 
power over things. "17 Thus the idea of controlling 
Nature was enhanced through the use of language to. 
help in the actual realization of a measure of con-
trol. Furthermore, language's facilitation of such 
instrumental tasks may have further reinforced the 
perception of separation from Nature. 
Orality and Literacy 
In this section of the paper I would like to 
speculate further on language, specifically on some 
of the differences between orality and literacy as 
forms of language, and on how those differences· 
might help to explain the modern Western view of 
Nature. 
It is difficult for us literate folk to imagine 
what it is like to live without any form of writing 
or even the knowledge of such a possibility. The 
fact of being literate changes our whole worldview 
to such an extent that we simply cannot comprehend 
the centrality and importance of the spoken word in 
oral cultures, nor can we fully understand what 
sorts of meanings the world resonated with in such 
cultures. Nevertheless, despite uncertainty about the 
Volume 3, 1991 
details, it appears that literacy has. had significant 
implications for how humans perce1ve the world. It 
has even been suggested that writing, "more than 
any other single inve~tion, ... has transformed human 
• nil 
consciOusness. 
To begin with, the aural world of orality was 
perceived as a more dynamic and alive place than 
our literate world. This is because in an oral cul-
ture, the form of language (speech) is an event. 
"Sound exists only when it is going out of 
existence ... there is no way to stop sound and have 
sound. "19 In this way, spoken words were not 
perceived as things, since they were never static.20 
Indeed, in orality, words, as such, we.re not per-
ceived; there were only utterances (whtch we now 
see as being made up of words). "Only the alphabet 
has the power to create "language" and "words," 
for the word does not emerge until it is written 
down. "21 Furthermore, in order to have sound, there 
must be life. Whereas it is possible to smell, see, 
touch and taste something that is dead (a buffalo, 
for example), it is not possible to hear it.22 
Because in orality the form of language is 
speech, by necessity it is always used (regardless of 
the use) in direct relation to other people. Even 
sustained analytic thought was always done with at 
least one other person, so that the listener could 
stimulate aud ground the process.23 This is because 
the thinker had only their memory to record thei~ 
thought~, and if the thoughts were complex and 
involved, another . person was needed to help t~e 
thinker maintain her or his line of thought. Thus, m 
orality, language use is inherently relati~nal, even 
though it may not have been used relat10nally or 
connective! y: 
Related to this is Ong's suggestion that in 
comparison to writing,' oral expression, at least in 
form, is "close to the human lifeworld," and 
grounds thought in close proximity to its context of 
human experience.24 "Oral cultures tend to use 
concepts in situational, operational frames of 
reference that are minimally abstract in the sense 
that theJ remain close to the living human life-
world." Furthermore, he suggests that orality is 
empathetic and participatory in that to gain know-
ledge of something one .must. achi.eve "cl?se, em-
. pathetic, communal Identification w1th the 
known. "26 In contrast, literate peoples most often 
understand things in a more abstract way, more 
detached from experience. 
In addition, oral discourse depends heavily on 
non-verbal and paralinguistic forms of communi-
cation. "The oral word ... never exists in a simply 
verbal context, as a written word does. Spoken 
words are always modifications of a total, existen-
tial situation, which always engages the body. "27 
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Such communication blends speech and body move-
ments and our embodiment is the most obvious 
indication that we are part of Nature.28 
The final characteristic of orality that is of 
interest here is the fact that it manifests language as 
sound rather than as visual representation, as 
writing does. Ong suggests that hearing is a unify-
ing sense whereas sight is an isolating sense. As he 
puts it: 
Vision comes to a human being from one 
direction at a time: to look at a room or a 
landscape, I must move my eyes around from 
one part to another. When I hear, however, I 
gather sound simultaneously from every d.irec-
tion at once: I am at the centre of my aud1tory 
world, which envelops me, establishing me at a 
· kind of core of sensation and existence:' 
Thus there is the sense of being immersed in the 
world of sound, whereas in a world dominated by 
sight, one cannot feel immersed. 
While the oral form of language is undoubted-
ly a partial abstraction from experience and there-
fore seems to be an initial step in the process of the 
reification of Nature, all of these characteristics of 
it still seem to indicate a mode of perception that is 
dynamic, relational, experiential, empathetic, em-
bodied and unifying.30 It is perhaps significant that 
these are in opposition to the modern scientific way 
of knowing Nature which is detached, abstract, 
theoretical, manipulative and "objective." An un-
derstanding of how literacy differs from orality may 
help to explain this change. 
In discussing The Domestication of the 
Savage Mind by Jack Goody, Ong notes that the 
shift from orality to literacy is closely related to 
what are thought to be the shifts from magic to 
science and from "prelogical II to "rational II con-
sciousness. Goody argues that those shifts ought 
rather to be seen and explained as .a shift from 
orality to literacy .31 Literacy, then, is seen to ~ave 
precipitated a further step towards abstract lo~~~al­
rational conscious thought and away from partiCipa-
tory, experiential knowing. There are a number of 
reasons for this. 
First of all, while oral discourse, supported 
by non-verbal forms of communication, is but one 
step away from experience, \~citing is a .second-
order abstraction from expenence. In th1s way, 
writing establishes a con~ext-free discourse;. texts 
assume an independent existence, and perception of 
the world changes. Once completed, writing is a 
form of expression that is detached from its author 
artd their experience of the world. "Writing fosters 
abstractions that disengage knowledge from the 
arena where human beings struggle with one an-
Volume 3, 1991 
other. It separates the knower from the known. "32 
Since writing is a detached and disembodied form 
of language, it is less able to convey the fullness . 
and subtlety of experience. Whereas in orality 
meaning is always· contextual, in literacy meaning 
is largely seen to be concentrated in language itself; 
it is "autonomous. "33 Accordingly, as Harold Innis 
says, "writing enormously enhanced a capacity for 
abstract thinking which had been evident in the 
growth of language in the oral tradition." [emphasis . 
added]34 . 
Secondly, by isolating words in a visual space, 
writing emphasizes sight as a way of knowing. As 
I have already mentioned, sight is a disjunctive 
sense when compared to hearing. In The Natural 
Alien, Neil Evernden suggests thatthe emphasis on 
vision as a way of knowing is partly responsible for 
our perception of being separate from Nature. 
"Vision permits us the luxurious delusion of being 
neutral observers with the abifity to manipulate a 
distant environment. "35 Furthermore, the visual 
form of language initiated the perception that words 
are things in and of themselves. "Writing makes 
'words' appear similar to things because we think of 
words as the visible marks signaling words to 
decoders: we can see and touch such inscribed 
'words' in texts and books. "36 By beginning-to reify 
the words with which Nature and experience were 
talked about (the representation), writing may have· 
enhanced the reification of Nature already begun by 
naming aspects of it. It se·ems possible, then, that 
·literacy was partly responsible for humans seeing 
the world reduced to elements and discrete entities. 
This perceptual process would have been 
· enhanced by the fact that in freeing the mind from 
its memory task, writing permits language to be 
used in the organization of elaborate reductionist 
analyses, and the creation of linear sequences of 
causality. Indeed writing itself seems .to foster a 
comparatively atomistic and linear view of things 
and events set in neutral space. 
. Finally, writing seems to have fragmented the 
understanding of the self in the community. Since 
sustained analytic thought could now be a solitary 
activity, with the thinker engaging in a dialogue in 
her or his mind, and with the written word, there 
was less need for social interaction. Reading and 
writing are solitary activities. Indeed, as Ivan Illich 
and Barry Sanders put it, "the idea of a self that 
continues to. glimmer in thought or memory, occa-
sionally retrieved and examined in the light of day, 
cannot exist without the text. "37 Literacy, then, may 
.have been th.e catalyst for the idea of the discrete, · 
autonomous individual. 
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Changing Perceptions of Nature 
Parallel to the shift from the dynamic rela-
tional character of orality to the comparatively static 
detached world of literacy, people have increasingly 
come to view the world and Nature as a static place 
of discrete objects, rather than a dynamic field of 
relationships. The evidence suggests that these 
changes were not simply coincidental to each other. 
Carolyn Merchant describes an example of 
where the advent of literacy changed the fundamen-
tal relationship of a culture with its natural world 
by emphasizing a visually-biased way of knowing . . 
In this case she is referring to the experiences of 
North. Ainerican Natives with European cultural 
imperialism in what is now New England. Sbe 
begins by describing the consciousness of oral 
Native cultures: · 
For Native American cultures, consciousness 
. was an integra·tion of all the bodily senses. in 
sustaining life. In that mimetic consciousness, 
culture was transmitted intergenerationally 
through imitation in song, myth, dance. sport, 
gathering, hunting and planting. Aural/oral 
transmission of tribal knowledge through myth 
and transactions between animals, Indians, and 
neighbouring tribes produced sustainable rela-
tions between the human and the non-human 
worlds .... For Indians engaged in an intimate 
survival relationship with nature, sight, smell, · 
sound, taste, and touch were all of equal import-
a.n?e, inte~ated iri a total participatory con~ 
SCIOUSness. · 
This participatory consciousness, which Merchant 
says characterizes the oral life of. the Native 
peoples, and which many ecophilosophers present 
as an alternative to Cartesian resourcist thinking, is 
described in more detail by Morris Berman in The 
Reenchantment of the World. Essentially it is a 
mimetic consciousness "in which the subject/object 
dichotomy breaks down and the person feels .ident-
ified with what he or she is perceiving. "39 
Merchant goes on to describe how when 
Europeans invaded the Native communities during 
what she calls the "colonial ecological revolution," 
vision became the dominant sense within the Indian 
culture, thus breaking the participatory conscious-
ness. This was because of the subtle effects that 
lay-literacy brought about through the focus on 
"God's word" as written in the Bible. Merchant 
explains: 
Alphanumeric· literacy became central to reli-
gious expression, social survival, and upward 
mobility. The Puritan imposition of a visually 
oriented consciousness was shattering to the 
continuation of Indian animism and ways of life. 
With the commercializing of the fur trade and 
the missionary efforts of Jesuits and Puritans, a 
society in which humans, animals, plants, and 
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rocks were equal subjects was changed to one 
dominated by transcendent vision in which 
human subjects were separate from resource 
objects. 40 
While literacy was subtly changing .human 
consciousness and perceptions of the world, it was 
also a key element in the concentration of mater-
ial/technical power and the building of military and 
political empires.41 We know that such empires are 
also dependent on exploitation of the natural world 
and that they often cause the degradation of Nature. 
In this way literacy seems to have been a catalyst 
for the accumulation of material and technological 
powers "over" Nature. As Mumford says, "the 
'myth of the machine' [his phrase for the almost 
religious belief in technological salvation] would 
have.been inconceivable, and its operations imprac-
ticable, without the magic of language and the 
formidable increase in its gower and scope through 
the invention of writing." 
The Greek Alphabet 
While writing seems to have generally 
changed the way humans perceive and experience 
the natural world, its most significant form may 
have been the Greek alphabet. This is because the 
"alphabet" was (and still is) a unique way of vis-
ually coding language. What makes the Greek 
alphabet unique is the fact that it was the first truly 
phonetic alphabet, in· contrast to other writing 
systems which used syllabic, ideographic or picto-
graphic codes or alphabet-like systems without 
vowels. The Greek alphabet was a way of visually 
coding the spoken sounds of any language with a 
small number of totally abstract symbols. It was 
only through the recording of those sounds that it 
provided meaning. It did not directly record ideas 
or images.43 In contrast, the symbols of most other 
writing systems were meaningful in themselves, 
since they were usually visually derived from things 
in the environment. ' · 
In their paper "Alphabet, Mother of Inven-
tion," Marshall McLuhan and R.K. Logan outline 
how the Greek alphabet developed and how it 
differs from other writing systems. They argue that 
as a result of the invention of the Greek alphabet, 
Greek consciousnesl and the consciousness Of those 
cultures whose writing systems developed from the 
Greek (including ours) were significantly altered. 
They further suggest that the uniquely abstract 
character of the Greek alphabet was partially re-
sponsible for the · formation of the dominant 
Western worldview and the enhancement of abstract 
ways of thinking. "The effects of the alphabet and 
the abstract, logical, systematic thought . that it 
encouraged explains why science began in the West 
and not the East, despite the much greater techno-
logical sophistication of the Chinese. "44 
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Both McLuhan and Logan, and Dolores 
LaChapelle. use the Chinese way of writing as a 
contrast to the Greek alphabet in order to suggest 
the profound effects it may have had on Western 
epistemology and perceptions of Nature. 
LaChapelle's contribution is especially interesting in 
that she is coming to the issue from the perspective 
of deep ecology. The difference is essentially that 
whereas the Greek alphabet is entirely abstract and 
detached from the lifeworld, Chinese retains mean-
ing within each of its over 40,000 characters, as it 
is a pictographic and ideographic form of writing. 
"Their written script grew directly out of the 
drawings of actual physical things in the environ-
ment ... Thus in the Chinese language, the human 
cannot get himself [sic] out of the total picture--
nature and human are always interconnected. "45 
· Two Chinese characters as they changed over the 
years from pictographs to their contemporary forms: 
mountain and rain. 
Source: Edoardo Fazzioli, Chinese Caligraphy 
(New York: Abbeville Press, 1987) 
With any writing system, the written symbols 
are an abstraction of. the spoken word which is, in 
turn, an abstraction of experience. With the alpha-
bet, however, the abstraction is even greater be-
cause of the fact that the characters are arbitrary 
and have no meaning in themselves. This, argue 
McLuhan and Logan, encouraged the creation of 
conceptual abstractions, classification schemes and 
atomistic thought within Greek society. Further-
more, they suggest that as a result of the alphabet, 
a new way of knowing emerged: 
With writing, what is recorded or remembered 
becomes separate from the writer, existing in a 
book or a scroll. Knowledge takes on objective 
identity, separate from the knower. The Greek, 
in this way, developed the notion of objectivity 
and detachment, the separation of the knower 
from the object of his [sic] awareness. This was 
the beginning of the scientific method and the 
source of the dichotomy the Greeks created 
between subjective thinking as found in art and 
poetry, and objective thinking as exemplified by 
philosophy and seience.44 
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This points directly to the alphabet and the shift it 
brought about in Greek thought as a source of our 
current world view. In particular we can see here 
the origins of the scientific epistemology that now 
dominates contemporary assumptions about how we 
ought to know the world. As Morris Berman, 
Carolyn Merchant and others have pointed out, this 
epistemology bodes ill for Nature. 
Another passage from McLuhan and Logan's 
paper is particularly revealing of the literate 
Greek's idea qf "nature." It further suggests that 
pre~ent views may be seen to be partially rooted in 
anctent Greece: 
The Greeks invented "nature" (phusis) which is 
their classification of the objective external 
world. "Nature" does not include . man [sic] or 
any of his (sic] artifacts such as the alphabet, 
which may explain why the Greeks never studied 
the effects, even of their own technology, a 
radical flaw in their objectivity. It was the 
separation of man [sic] from nature, "perhaps, 
that allowed Western thinkers to consider nature 
as an object to be studied, or a resource to be 
exploited. 41 
Overall then, the invention of the Greek 
alphabet seems to have represented a significant 
turning point in Western thought. It seems to have 
enhanced the linguistic basis for a linear, abstract 
and analytical mode of thought, and for a detached 
view of Nature. It therefore may have further 
contributed to the domination of Nature because, in 
lending itself to rational, scientific and technical 
thinking, it allowed for further inventions that could 
be used to control and exploit Nature. The Greek 
alphabet becomes even more significant when we 
consider that all Western alphabets are descended 
from it. So, even though the languages differ, the 
ways of visually coding them are similar in their 
abstract character, and perhaps the ways of thinking 
about the world are also similar. 
Printing 
In terms of the historical changes in the form 
of language, there is one other invention that de-
serves comment in this context. That is the advent 
of mechanical printing. Essentially print extends 
and heightens the process already begun with writ-
ing. It suggests even more than writing that words 
are things; it reifies words:• This is because it is 
much more precise at controlling the visual presen-
tation of words and because it more effectively 
locks them into space. In doing so, it not only 
reifies them, but also further eliminates the need to 
sound words out as one reads them.49 This takes the 
user one step further away from the aural world 
where ytOrds are sounds and events. As Walter Ong 
suggests, print completed the process of .the tech-
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nologizing of the word. Furthermore, mechanical 
printing was a manufacturing process, and by 
putting language into that process, words were 
commodified.50 All of this suggests a further per-
ceptual distancing and separation of language from 
its grounding in experience, and perhaps of humans 
from Nature as well. I think ecophilosopher Alan 
Drengson sums up well the impact of printing on 
the human participation in the processes of life: 
The hazard of print culture, and the modern 
industrial technology that goes with it, is that all 
of our thoughts and perceptions will become 
structured according to modes of organization 
that these technologies make possible. This has 
a powerful effect on our own dimensions of 
creative intelligence and flexibility. It tends to 
constrict our openness to Being.~' 
As with all of these changes in the form of lan-
guage, both the form itself and the uses which it 
makes possible, intertwine with each other to fur-
ther perceptually separate humans from non-human 
Nature. 
Conclusion: Language and Nature Today 
This paper has been an exploration of how 
some of the historical changes in the form of lan-
guage may have affected human perceptions of non-
human Nature. In particular, I have suggested that 
language may have been a catalyst for a perceived 
separation of humans from the rest of Nature. This 
process seems to have begun with the advent of 
language, become. intensified through writing and 
then printing, and been especially evident in the 
West where our alphabets are descended from the 
original Greek alphabet. Furthermore, language 
seems to have enhanced the ability of humans to 
m~nipulate and control aspects of the world, and in 
domg so, may have further reinforced this initial 
perception of separation. I realize that this has been 
somewhat of a preliminary consideration of these 
questions, for they probably deserve a more de-
tailed analysis than space has permitted me here. 
Nevertheless, in outlining them I have hopefully 
been able to contextualize the current issues we 
must face and added to our understanding of how 
. we got here. 
Language remains a critical issue in today's 
context of the domination of humans and Nature 
for in a number of different ways, it continues t~ 
order and shape the meanings we give to our ex-. 
periences. In both its form and its content it con-
tinues to be a powerful force in shaping human 
consciousness. Just one example of this is the fact 
that many of the names we apply to aspects of 
Nature seem to reinforce a detached and use-
oriented view of it. Consider the ubiquitous label 
for valued aspects of the natural world: "natural 
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resources." The implication of this phrase is that 
the sole purpose of non-human Nature is to benefit 
humans. This term is a symbol for the anthropocen-
tric-resourcist view of Nature that permeates 
Western society. By .using the label "natural re-
sources" we may not be intending to promote such 
a view, but the fact is that that view is implied in 
the choice of words. There is a sort of incidental 
persuasion in the way that the label acts to rein-
force the values and attitudes associated with the 
dominant view of Nature. The same may be said of . 
such terms as "environment," "our land," and 
perhaps even "nature." 
These are not isolated examples; in all cases 
where w~ talk about Nature, our experience of it or 
how we relate to it, we are actively constructing an 
idea or view of what it is. In this way we can say 
that· we linguistically construct "Nature," and the 
way we construct it has direct implications for how 
we act in relation to it. As Carolyn Merchant puts 
it, 
a society's symbols and images of nature express 
its collective consciousness. They appear in 
mythology, cosmology, science, religion, philos-
ophy, language, and art ... .ldeas, images, and 
metaphors legitimate human behaviour toward 
nature and are translated into action through 
ethics, morals, and taboos.~1 
This idea that our representations of non-human 
Nature affect not only how we see it, but also how 
we act towards it, applies to all forms of discourse 
that use lanBuage, including, and perhaps especial-
ly, science. . · 
In this paper I have emphasized those charac-
teristics of certain language forms that seem to have 
had a bearing on human perceptions of Nature, 
particularly those that may have had a disjunctive 
influence. However, I do not mean to suggest that 
the history of language has been simply a history of 
its having caused humans to see themselves as 
separate from Nature. In many ways language has 
enhanced our understanding of the world and of 
ourselves. Furthermore, I believe that it is possible 
to think of, and use language in ways that can 
overcome its disjunctive influences. For, as Lewis 
Mumford reminds us, 
the. very qualities in language that offend the 
logical positivists--its vagueness, its indeter-
minateness, its ambiguity, its· emotional coloring, 
its reference to ·unseen objects or unverifiable 
events, in short its 'subjectivity'--only indicate 
that from the beginning it was an instrument for 
embracing the living body of human experience, 
not just the bleached articulated skeleton Qf 
definable ideas.~ 
Thus, language can be used in a more evoca-
tive and relational way, but we must Jearn to use it 
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that way if we hope to bring about a change in our 
relationship to the rest of Nature. To do this, we 
first need to explore how our existing language is 
contributing to the problem and how it may provide 
opportunities for change. This involves questioning 
both its appropriateness and its adequacy. Secondly, 
we need to re-understand language in a non-anthro-
pocentric and non-utilitarian way, and find new 
ways of talking ·that will promote new ways of 
thinking. We need now to regain a sense of wonder 
in our language and to use our voices to speak 
within our species about how we feel about Nature. 
I am hopeful that just as feminists and other social 
justice advocates are now finding their proper 
voices, Nature advocates will as well. 
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Rethinking the Ecological Crisis 
The stories we tell about ·nature reveal a great 
deal about ·how . we think about ourselves, our 
society and the world. in which we live. Nature is 
one of those potent cultural spaces within which a 
society plays out its dreams and fears, its ambitions 
and anxieties. _ As John Rodman reminds us, "just 
as our statements about other people tend also to be 
concealed statements about ourselves, so statements 
about nonhuman nature tend also to be concealed 
statements . about the human condition. "1• 
Constructed through our various discourses, ideas 
of nature can be read as maps of our historically 
and culturally-constituted consciousness. 
One of the most compelling modern-day 
stories we are writing about nature tells us that our 
activities are putting nature at risk. This troubling 
narrative warns us that our current practices 
threaten to cause massive ecological disruption if 
we do not soon change our way of life. Certainly 
enough, all of the elements of this story exist in the 
world around us as empirical realities. Each of 
these elements--instances of pollutio!l, deforest-
ation, species extinction, . etc. --have their own 
contexts and thus are meaningful to certain com-
munities of people in certain ways. Yet it is only 
relatively recently that these individual instances 
have taken on a more commanding authority as they 
are woven together into a master narrative called 
the Ecological Crisis. 
History reminds us of how concepts· of nature 
have been closely intertwined with ideas about 
society. And despite our own positivistic assur-
ances, mapping the social onto .the natural continues 
to be an activity we unco_nsciously engage in. Thus 
decoding our constructions of nature tells us much 
· about what we consider to b~ the good society, and 
about how we draw the boundaries between order 
arid disorder' balance and imbalance, and stability 
and instability. From this perspective, the ecologi-
cal crisis tells a story about a society that has 
managed to violate its own _boundaries. 
The ecological crisis tells another story--one 
with a more discomforting message. · All crisis 
discourse plays upon a textual field of culturally- . 
• Daryl Lu is a srudml pursuing his Masrers al York University. 
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generated authority. Its power derives from its 
ability to reconstruct the past and future, thereby 
delimiting the possibilities available to the present. 
_In structuring events into a ·crisis, we reveal a great 
deal about ourselves, most of it not very flattering. 
As we. will see, . the ecological crisis is woven into 
a morality play of biblical proportions. The lan-
guage, as befits such a play, is one of morality and 
temperance versus disease and despoliation. Using 
the world as its stage, crisis discourse foretells 
apocalypse. 
Ecology as (science) fiction 
Scientists tell stories about the world. Despite 
claims to value-neutrality, the laboratory isolates 
neither scientists nor their work from the contami-
nation of their social context. Scientists are human 
beings and members of various communities; as 
such, the questions they ask and the answers they 
seek are framed by their existential and social 
worlds. With this in ~ind, I intend to approach 
scientific knowledge as if it w~re literature. Both 
science and fiction are exercises in story-telling. 
To read science as literature is to acknowledge that 
scientific _knowledge responds to the world around 
it; that it does not progress only through some 
intrinsic logic of discovery. Scientists' narratives, 
constructed out of the resources of their disciplines, 
are inextricably woven together with the other 
discourses of society. Together these form the 
fabric of our culture. 
Reading science as literature enables us to 
break down the precariously-maintained boundaries 
between fact and value, description and prescrip-
tion, and reality and imagination. The literary 
strategies scientists use--analogy, metaphor and 
narrative-should not be read as merely helpful 
explanatory devices. Rather, these strategies are 
essential for defining, explaining and giving mean-
ing to the objects of scientific inquiry. Drawing 
upo~ a potent metaphorical language, the discourses 
of scientific ecology are extraordinarily rich in 
meaning. The proliferation of popular ecologies 
attests to the numerous interpretive possibilities 
offered by scientific ecology.2 Readi-ng ecology as 
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(science) fiction shows us how the discourses ·of 
scientists are. also commentaries on society, and 
how ecologists are implicated in the social construc-
tion of the ecological crisis. 
Reading ecology as literature reveals just how 
deeply the human practice of science is embedded. 
in the cultural world. Perhaps more explicitly than 
any other science, ecology weaves together the 
growing concerns of what people in western indus-
trial societies call the human condition? Ecology 
has developed as the focal point for" anxieties 
expressed about unrestrained economic growth, the 
accelerating rate of industrial and technological 
change, increasing environmental degradation and 
the breakdown of social cohesion. 
One of the most potent ecological story-
tellers is Eugene P. Odum, a central figure in the 
development of the New Ecology--the ecosystem-
centred, bioeconomic paradigm that has dominated 
post-World War II ecology.• When we read his . 
discourses as literature, Odum becomes a most 
lyrical scientist. Ecosystems are corim1unities with 
specialists and generalists engaging in mutually-." 
beneficial relationships, "just like well-ordered 
human societies. "5 The nature-society analogy is 
illuminating, but just as significant is the under I ying 
conviction that order is a natural and positive . 
quality in both the human and natural worlds. In 
dialectical fashion, social concerns are written into 
nature, and natural orders become privileged guides 
for restructuring society. In a world where the 
social and natural orders are so closely interwoven, 
threats to one order are immediately translated into 
threats to the other. · 
Odum serves us weil as a paradigmatic figure 
who embodies the tensions inherent in the practices 
and discourses of ecological science. As a natural 
science, ecology is framed by a familiar set of 
dichotomies: fact/value, objectivity/subjectivity, 
science/politics, etc. Scientific authority, founded 
on the claim of access to the "real," is exercised 
only within the discursive field of science itself. 
Science intrudes into politics only as an arbifer of 
the real.· Yet environmental discourses show how 
difficult it is to maintain these distinctions. This is 
illustrated in Odum 's recent introductory textbook 
on. ecological principles, Ecology and Our Endan-
gered Life-Support Systems. Scattered through-
out this book are what Odum calls his. "personal 
views" on various environmental problems.6 These 
are placed in boxes, spatially and symbolically 
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severing them from the author(ity) of the scientific 
text. Ecology and Our Endangered Life-Sup-
port Systems stands as a symbol of the unstable, 
volatile division between science and politics, and 
nature and society. 
These boundaries between fact and value and 
science and politics break.down if we allow for the 
idea that scientists actively participate in the con-
struction of the world they seek to know. What is 
the -object to he studied? How is this object to be 
def!ned? What questions are to be put to this 
object? How are the answers to be interpreted and 
explained? In asking and answering these ques-
tions, scientists embed their values into the world 
they study. Ecology, as Carolyn Merchant points 
out, "is a particular twentieth-century construction 
of nature. "7 There is a great deal of twentieth 
century history embedded in one of ecology's most 
potent constructions of nature: the ecosystem. 
Produced through the practices and discourses 
of ecology, the ecosystem is a relatively new object 
of scientific inquiry. Although the term was first 
coined in 1935, the ·ecosystem did not become a 
significant organizing concept until the ascendancy 
of the New. Ecology after World War II. 8 Continu-
ing debates on what criteria are appropriate for 
categorizing and classifying ecosystems suggest that 
the concept has not yet stabilized.9 Given the 
historical genesis of the ecosystem, it seems reason-
able to expect that the concerns of post-war Ameri-
can society--a time and place imprinted with the 
image of the atomic cloud--are coded into this 
recently-constructed object of nature. 
Ecology. in the Nuclear Age 
· The metaphor of The Bomb serves as a power-
ful representation of the anxious and ambiguous 
tensions of' post-World War II society. The Bomb 
is a fusion of order and disorder; in Cold War 
discourse it is both the guardian of, and greatest 
threat to human survival. The Bomb, along with its 
hyper-technological delivery systems and infrastruc-
ture, embodies the pinnacle of achievement for a 
dynamic, energetic scientific-technological culture. 
It is also an ironic, nightmarish symbol of growth 
and progress gone out of control, manifested in the 
escalating insanity of the arms race. As a meta-
phor, The Bomb serves us well as a potent symbol 
for the anxieties, tensions and ambiguities experi-
enced by those who live in the nuclear age. · 
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Written into the troubled his-
tory of The Bomb is the desire for 
creating ·stability in an age when 
accelerating change is perceived· to 
be an . essential, defining feature. 
Both metaphorically and literally, 
The Bomb is the most potent creator 
of order; ironically it does so by 
threatening disorder. Out of the 
chaos of World War II emerged a 
precipitous world order of nuclear 
nations, maintained by the threat of 
global atomization. At the same 
time, technological and industrial 
change, . environmental transform-
ation and sexual and racial chal-
lenges to existing social and political 
structures contributed to the general 
societal discourse concerning order, 
disorder and the possibilities for 
reordering. This is the turbulent · 
social context in which the New 
Ecologists w·orked--coding what they 
experienced as the human condition 
into their own construction of nature. 
The post-war concerns over order and stability 
in a time of disruption and change are woven into 
the fabric of nature by ecological science. The 
legacy of evol4tionary theory was to bequeath 
ecology a dynatnic, changing conceMion of nature. 
The natural world is a messy affair, full of genetic 
variance and biological noise. The quest of New 
Ecology is to find an ordered, underlying structure 
within this world of change and disorder. Thus, 
Odum tells us that "the principle function of an 
ecosystem is to make possible the orderly cycle of 
life. "10 It is· no surprise that his texts are filled with 
intricate but tidy flowcharts--schematics of the 
underlying order of the natural world. 
. In the rarified world of scientific ·metaphysics, 
change is strictly a quantitative phenomenon.11 In 
·. a universe of pure matter and motion, change is an 
alteration of states from one moment in time to the 
next. Within this metaphysical system, the role of 
science is to catalogue, explain and predict change. 
Science is outside the world of values, thus scien-
tists make no judgments as to whether change is 
good or bad. Reading the story of ecology, how-
ever, shows us that the anxieties of post-war society 
are coded into its construction of nature, and are 
revealed ·in its own troubled discourses concerning 
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the nature of change. 
In the ecological construction o.f nature, change 
is not mere! y quantitative. Rather, ecosystem 
change is coded as good or bad in a way that 
reflects our own · particular cultural and social 
experiences of change. Ecosystem succession is 
referred to as maturation and development--west-
ern codes for personal and societal growth, progress 
and transformation. The modern western concept 
of history as progression is replayed in the arena of 
ecosystem evolution. Self, society and nature are 
woven together by a common natural impulse for 
development. 
Referred to positively as maturation and devel-
opment, ecosystem change is intertwined with an 
underlying commitment to the notions of order and 
stability. Left undisturbed, ecosystems move 
towards a relatively balanced climax state. As one 
biologist notes, "the idea of an unbalanced, 
stochastically driven natural community inspires 
distrust. "11 · But change that is predictable and 
which leads to stability is considered, and coded, 
positively. 
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That which is considered negative change is 
coded into the construction of the ecosystem as 
stress. In ecology, stress is II any environmental 
influence that causes a measurable ecological 
change. II 13 But as Donna Haraway has noted, over 
the past half-century stress has emerged as II a 
dominant integrating concept for post-war social and 
personal life ... .In an evolutionary context, stress 
idiom was p;lrt of an anxious discourse about 
nuclear war, environmental destruction, unprece-
dented population growth, sexual and racial con-
flict." 14 In human affairs, stress idiom is used to 
express the concern that individuals and social 
systems are ill-equipped to deal with the demands of 
modern-day existence. External factors are beyond 
control; the management of stress requires better, 
more accurate information about unfolding situ~ 
ations. In ecological discourse, stress is a sign that 
western society is maladaptive. Alleviating stress 
is about determining and setting limits to human 
influence on the environment; overshooting these 
limits threatens unpredictable, disruptive change. 
Thus the .concept of stress effectively weaves 
together the anxious post-war concerns with human, 
societal and natural adaptability in a time of un-
precedented change. The Bomb stands at this 
unstable boundary where order becomes disorder. 
It is a powerful symbol of progress spirali.ng out of 
control and becoming stressful. Coded negatively, 
stress is translated into environmental discourse as 
chaotic and thus unpredictable change.. Within this 
frame of discourse, stressed systems lead to ecologi-
cal disruption, collapse and crisis. Thus stress 
discourse implies a normative state of nature, 
captured as the orderly cycle of life revealed by the 
science of ecology. Stress, and thus (modern 
industrial) human existence, is abstracted out of this 
ecological norm. Integrating modern society into 
nature means successfully adapting it to the con-
straints of the normative ecosystem. There is no 
place for stress in an ecological future. 
Global Cancers and Social Surgery 
In post-war environmental discourse, percep-
tions of growth ·and development are intertwined. 
with ideas of order and disorder. The socio-cultural 
boundary between order and disorder is transcribed 
onto our perception of growth, yielding two oppos-
ing concepts. Healthy growth--both individual and 
societal--is orderly .and self-regulating. Unhealthy 
growth is growth which spirals out of control, 
generating disorder and chaos. In ~ modern fusion 
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of biological and social discourses, runaway growth 
is captured in a powerful, ominous and potentially 
dangerous metaphor: cancer. 
In ·the minds of twentieth-century industrial 
peoples, cancer is a most insidious disease. It 
symbolizes the body in revolt; it is ·about the loss of 
control. Technically, cancer is caused by cells 
which have lost the ability to regulate and restrain 
their growth. Metaphorically, cancer is about the 
body destroying itself from inside. Inscribed into 
the bodies of society and nature, the metaphor 
mutates into a disturbing biosocial discourse about 
undesirables such as "population overgrowth, social 
disorder, pollution, and other forms of societal and 
environmental cancer." 15 
In a· culture that fears mortality, disease meta-
phors are especially powerful. Disease is something 
that is out of balance; it is an affront to the purity 
of the body. Illness is closely associated to im-
morality; disease is often considered a punishment 
for moral weakness. Susan Sontag points out that 
"cancer is a metaphor for what is most ferociously 
energetic; and these energies constitute the ultimate 
insult to the natural order. "16 Once likened to 
cancer, disruptive changes--in nature and in society 
--are coded as unnatural and potentially lethal. 
Cancer, in a culture closely associated with 
death, is a crisis disease. Once it corrupts the 
bodies of society and nature, it is imperative that 
severe action be taken. Treating cancer is akin to 
waging warfare of the most drastic kind; chemical 
and radiation treatments allude to the most frighten-
. ing weapons ever conceived. Tumours are surgical-
ly removed, an expression that has found its way 
into the euphemisms of modern warfare. To call 
something a cancer is to advocate taking drastic 
action against it. To label human beings and human 
practices· a disease is to effectively remove any 
vestiges of humanity from them. To abstractly 
dehumanize a situation by likening it to cancer and 
then suggesting performing social surgery is an 
incredible act of violence against the person. 
As Georges Canguilhem has observed, disease 
is . envisioned as a polemical situation between 
oppositions--"a battle between the organism and a 
foreign substance, or an internal struggle between 
opposing forces. "17 The cancer metaphor lies at the 
intersection of a number of such ·oppositions: order 
and disorder, purity and pollution, the natural and 
the unnatural. Once translated into the master 
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opposition of health/disease, there can be no syn-
thetic, dialectical resolution to these oppositional 
pairs. Framed by the limits of binary categories, 
disease must be cured, or the patient dies. A 
person who lives with a disease is considered to be 
unhealthy and handicapped--i.e. less than a full 
person. 
However, coding health and disease as an 
oppositional pair is misleading. While disease is 
defined in reference. to a norm, and sickness does 
imply a state of health, exactly what health is, 
however, remains open. Canguilhem reminds us 
that "in order to discern what is normal or patho-
logiCal for the body itself, one must look beyond 
the body. With a disability like astigmatism or 
myopia, one would be normal in an agricultural or 
a pastoral society but abnormal for sailing ·or 
flying. "'a What is considered healthy is depenqent 
upon the context of a particular mode of human 
existence. 
Thus to talk, as Odum and others do, of main-
taining "healthy ecosystems" is p.roblematic.19 
Health is·a relative concept which cannot be deter-
mined outside of the context of human practices. 
But in environmental discourse, the idea of healthy 
ecosyst~ms implies a normative, decontextualized 
state of nature. Framed by binary opposition, 
ecological discourse is trapped into oscillating 
between two absolutes: the healthy and the un-· 
healthy. The healthy is modelled after the norma-
tive ecosystem: the natural community uninfluenced 
by human activity, the ecosystem free of stress, the 
ecosystem that allows for the orderly cycling of 
life. If an ecosystem is not healthy, then by defini-
tion it must be unhealthy. An unhealthy ecosystem 
is a sign of disease. It is an indicator of unhealthy 
human practices--activities that are considered 
disruptive to order, out of balance, unnatural, 
polluting, immoral--i.e., human practices that do 
not conform to the limits of the normative ecosys-
tem. Health discourse, like stress idiom, is about 
socially constructing "objective" limits to human 
activity. · 
Ecological Crises and Salvation Mythology 
Read as literature, the ecological crisis and its 
.associated discourses are all about negotiating what 
we consider to be the good life and the good so-
ciety. Crisis, stress, disease, health--we embed 
each of these notions with ideas about what counts 
as order, balance, stability and harmony. These 
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ideas, coded into our constructions of nature, 
become the guardians and enforcers of the social 
order. The ecological crisis exists because we 
collectively adhere to a normative state of nature all 
the while we engage in practices which disrupt this 
socially-constructed norm. Ecology inscribes the 
cultural boundary between order and disorder onto 
the natural ecosystem. Ecological disruption tells 
us we have crossed that boundary. 
From one perspective, Eugene Odum's Ecol-
ogy and Our Endangered Life-Support Systems 
is an introduction to ecological -principles. From 
another, it is a story about the loss of innocence and 
the promise of redemption. · Odum's narrative 
begins with a parable: the ill-fated flight of Apollo 
13. Technological Man, ever striving for know-
·ledge and betterment, sets his sights on reaching the 
heavens. His spacecraft is a tiny, simplistic replica 
of the Earth; once it leaves the safety of the life-
giving biosphere a crisis intervenes_. A short circuit 
causes an explosion, critically damaging the earth-
surrogate's life-support systems. The lives of the 
astronauts are threatened and the mission must be 
abandoned. Survival is the only imperative. 
Happily, with the ingenuity of ·the astronauts and a 
massive collective effort on Earth, the spacecraft is 
safely maneuvered back to the life-sustaining womb 
of the planet. 
The remainder of Odum's book is essentially 
a reprise of this parable, authoritatively couched in 
the language of scientific discourse. Humanity, 
unable to restrain itself, is threatening the biosphere 
with rampantly out-of-control industrialization and 
population growth. Ecological collapse is inevitable 
if human beings do not end tbis . unnatural and 
unhealthy behaviour. Ecology, the arbiter of what 
is natural, shows us how we are to act and what 
limits we are to obey. Either we heed this warning 
and outgrow our immatur~ ways, or we face certain 
doom. "The Transition From Youth to Maturity" 
is the title of the epilogue; its ·allusion to the meta-
phor of orderly growth, development and transform-
ation hints at both the cultural imperative and 
biological necessity of social reordering along 
ecological principles.20 Society, like human beings, 
must grow up. 
Environmental and ecological discourse is this 
salvation myth writ large. An extraordinary num-
ber of these discourses follow the narrative se-
quence of the fall and redemption. Man (that 
western symbol for the collectivity of human be-
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ings) begins in a state of harmony and equilibrium 
with Nature.21 Through some series of ~vents or 
misfortunes this equilibrium is upset . and Man 
leaves the Garden to begin a new kind of existence. 
Man's new life, so seductive at first, begins to 
spiral out of control, increasing! y upsetting the 
delicate balance of Nature. This headlong spirar 
reaches a point of crisis, presenting Man with a 
decision. Either he renounces his unnatural exist-
ence or he faces the apocalypse. Choosi'ng--hope-
fully~-to return to his origins, Man is welcomed 
back into the Garden, reintegrating into a peaceful 
co-existence with Nature. The front cover of a 
well-known alternative magazine captures the 
essence of this salvation narrative: "Paradise Found: 
How the environmental crisis can improve our 
lives. "22 
Read within the context of the salvation narra-
tive, the ecological crisis is a way of .structuring 
and giving meaning to the present. The present is 
constructed as a particular time within ·the histori-
cal.-narrative sequence; this time is called a "crisis 1' 
(literally, a turning point). ·Framed by the possibil-
ities of salvation mythology, the present is con-
structed as a binary opposition. A crisis requires 
resolution. Either we take drastic action and save 
ourselves and nature, or we face imminent destruc-
tion. As prophecy, crisis discourse attempts to 
control the present by creating the future. 
Like stress idiom and cancer metaphors, crisis 
discourse straddles the precarious boundary between 
order and disorder. Crises are situations out of 
control; the response is to exercise even greater 
control over . whatever it is we define to be the 
problem. In environmental discourses, the problem 
is usually associated with some state of human 
affairs--often economic insanity or reproductive 
fecundity. · These are situations that are out of 
control; they are sources of disorder. Crisis dis-
course is about identifying pockets of disorder and 
advocating that they be reordered. In chaos lies the 
potential· for remaking a new ox:der. 
Through narrating the story of the ecological 
crisis, I have hoped to rewrite it as a problematic. 
The ecological crisis is just one out of an indefinite 
number of stories we can write about nature. 
Along with the rest of the stories we write,. the 
ecological crisis offers itself as a discourse out of 
which we construct our versions of reality. The 
narrative I have written about the ecological crisis 
tells a story about how we construct the world we 
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live in; it suggests that in constructing the world we 
bot~ create and limit our horizon .of possibilities: 
As Mary Douglas has pointed out; the control 
of time is a most effective way of generating a 
moral consensus. "Time is like all the other doom 
_points in the universe. One and all are social 
weapons of control. "23 ·And perhaps she is right 
· when she suggests that "we must talk threateningly 
about time .. .if .we hope to get anything done. We 
must believe in the limitations and boundaries of 
natqre which our community projects. "1~ Yet, I 
hope that no one can use this d.oom point without it 
weighing on their conscience. For just as the 
ecological crisis is an effective tool for provoking 
action, it also radically forecloses the realm of 
possibilities. And I cannot help but think that in 
this sense, constructing an ecological crisis is an act 
of violence against our vision of ourselves. 
Notes 
1. John Rodman, "The Liberation of Nature?," Inquiry 20 
(1977), p. 105. 
2. For example, Murray Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom 
(Palo Alto: Cheshire Books, 1982); Bill Devall and George 
Sessions, Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered (Salt 
Lake City: Peregrine Books, 1985); Warwick Fox, Toward a 
Transpersonal Ecology (Boston: Shambhala, 1990). 
3. Resisting the convention of capitalizing "western" is 
intended to oppose the notion that there is any one thing that 
can be called the West. On this point, Edward Said has been 
instrumental in rendering the identity of the "West" problem-
atic. See Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1979). 
4. Donald Worster, Nature's Economy: A llistory of Eco-
.logical Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
p. 311. 
5.' Eugene P. Odum, Ecology and Our Endangered Life-
Support Systems (Sunderland, Massachusetts: Sinauer 
Associates, 1989), p. 3~ and p. 52. 
6. lbid., p. ix . . 
7. Carolyn Merchant, "The Theoreti~al Structure of Ecological 
· · Revolutions;" Environmental Review 11:4 (Winter 1987), p. 
267. . 
8. Robert P. Mcintosh, ··Ecology Since 1900," in Issues and 
Ideas in America, eds. Benjamin J. Taylor and Thurman J. 
White (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1976), p. 362. 
9. Odum, p. 58. 
10. Bernard C. Patten and Eugene P. Odum, "The Cybernetic 
Nature of Ecosystems, • The American Naturalist 118:6 
(December 1981), p. 890. 
Volume 3, 1991 
11. On the metaphysics of modern science, see Alfred North 
Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: 
Macmillan, 1925). 
12. David Simberloff, • A Succession of Paradigms in Ecology: 
Essentialism to Materialism and Probabilism, • Synthese 43 
(1980), p. 30. 
13. Bill Freedman, Environmental Ecology: The Impacts of 
Pollution and Other Stresses on Ecosystem Structure and 
Function (San Diego: Academic Press, 1989), p. 4. 
14. Donna Haraway, Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and 
Nature in the World of Modern Science (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1989), p. 224. 
15. Eugene P. Odum, "The Emergence of Ecology as a New 
Integrative Discipline, • Science 195:4284 (March 25, 1977), 
p. 1289. 
16. Sus-an Sontag, lllness a's Metaphor and AIDS and Its 
Metaphors (New York and London: Anchor Books, 1990), p. 
68. 
17. G~rges Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological 
(New York: Zone Books, 1989), p. 41. 
Undercurrents 18 
18. Ibid., pp. 200-201. 
19. Odum, Ecology and Our En~angered Life-Support 
Systems, p. 271. See also Don E. Marietta Jr., "The lnterrc:--
lationship of Ecological Science and Environmental Ethics, • 
Enviroumental Ethics 1:3 (Fall 1979), p. 201. 
20. Odum, Ecology and Our Endangered Life-Support 
Systems, p. 271. 
21. Feminist scholarship has made it impossible to maintain 
the fiction that "Man" speaks for all persons. Here, Man, 
Nature and Garden are advanced ironically 
(and thus arc: capitalized) to draw attention to the role 
these totalizing fictions continue to play in structuring the dis-
courses of the ecological crisis. 
22. Utne Reader 36 (November/December 1989). 
23. Mary Douglas, "Environments at Risk," in Ecology, The 
Shaping Enquiry, ed. Jonatha.n Benthall (London: Longman, 
1972), p. 136, 142. 
24. Ibid., p. 52. 
Volume 3, 1991 
The Better Bathroom: 
A Spiritual and Political Landscape 
Introduction 
Imagine this scene: luxuriant broadleaf green-
ery, ferns and verdant mosses. Perhaps a rock or 
two poking through. ·A pool, perhaps with clear 
water, but · obviously deep, and a waterfall, flash-
ing and tumbling, soothing to the ear, and lending 
the air a tangible humidity. Filtered sunlight dap-
ples the waters. 
The image is familiar: it is a preferred adver-
tising backdrop because it is exactly a cultural idyll-
/idol.1 We see it in advertisements for cigarettes, 
for ·au kinds of detergents, for cars and all other 
types of environmentally-adverse consumer goods. 
In advertising it is a -manipulated image, but it can 
only be ·manipulated because it already has cultural 
standing. The image also appears on the big screen, 
as a background to positive action, to romance, to 
private scenes, and resolution of tragedy. It is our 
entertainment and solace. 2 
Other landscapes have cultural standing. The 
French hold ·.the American desert as the proper 
ground for inner exploration; the British have a 
pastoral ideal. Mountains have acquired a special 
place in Anglo-American culture. We go into the 
mountains to be away from people, to escape the 
urban world. It was not - until the urban world 
existed that mountains acquired their cultural value, 
as a place to get in touch with the soul, without the 
commotion of the city .3 Appreciation of landsc-
apes is not simply at the level of seeing the objects 
that comprise the view: landscapes are also the 
fields in· which spiritual reflection takes place, and 
as a consequence landscape can never be completely 
described in the absence of human aspirations. The 
human aspiration that has become attached to 
mountains in North America is that of self-discove-
ry: here the receptive individual finds the unity 
between their singular being and that of the rest of 
the· cosmos.· In the mountains and the forests one 
finds oneself, composes on·eself, is constituted. 
These were the terrains of Thoreau and Muir, 
American transcendentalists of the last century. It is 
.by Andrew Satterthwaite* 
in the grandiose spaces of mountains that, paradoxi-
cally, we find the intimacy of our own being. 
The positivity of the woodland glade with 
waterfall also resides in its potential for intimacy. 
This, like the mountains is not a place for crowds. 
This is nature stripped of awesome grandeur, pos-
. sessing a directly personal quality that is surely 
important. There is room for a closer ex-ploration 
of this more intimate side to the nature idyllic. But 
let me expand the image I started this paper with. 
Imagine where the stream is going: things get more 
difficult here, for the image is not so fixeq in 
modern culture - perhaps it just goes down a dark 
hole, with a gurgle at the end. In a bygone age 
doubtless this dark hole would be gaping and 
mysterious, and perhaps it still is. But then it went 
down to Hades,_ and the realms of the dead, and the 
stream was variously the_ Styx, the Lethe, the 
Jordan, the Ganges, etc.• Now in our mind's eye it 
might as well_ go down the plughole, to end up in 
the sewage plant or the septic · tank, for we have 
already lost our paths to Heaven and Hell. As Ivan · 
Illich notes in H 20 and the Waters of Forgetful-
ness, the water that goes down .the plughole is no 
longer magical.j . 
Ill ich was con~erned with · water that ran 
through pipes, and did not reflect too much in his 
book on how we think of the water before it is let 
out of the bath. He especially. did not think of the 
space in which we find that water. And here we · 
come to the central motif of this article: that small 
room in which we take our privacy. Specifically I 
-am concerned to explore the cultural place of the 
modern bathroom within our practice and meta-
physics. I am concerned to explore the way in 
which we, as individuals and as a culture, reform- . 
ulate, rethink, ourselves in the bathroom. We 
apparently do this by a strange cultural metamor-
phosis that in part entails redefining the bathroom, 
and redefining nature at the same time, as well as 
many of the precepts that inform our sensibility of 
what constitutes nature, and what · constitutes a 
bathroom. 
*Andrew Satterthwaite is a graduate of the Masters program althe Facully of Environmental Studies, York University. His thesis was 
entitled •The Human Understanding and the Natural World." 
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The relations between nature, culture and self 
are the relations of our everyday being. These rela-
tions are defined in part by our practices, and in 
part by our beliefs. The analysis of these relations, 
always dynamic in themselves, is not always as 
simple as marking out the physical boundaries 
between city · and trees, between animals and hu-
mans. Oftentimes these relations are extraordinarily 
subtle, not least because they are the most basic to 
any civilization. 6 Tracing the relations that obtain 
· at any given timeT in any given culture, is in its 
· entirety an obviously impossible task. What can be 
attempted, mostly by way of providing the merest 
outline, is a sketch of some small part of these 
relations, and this is what I hope to accomplish 
here. By focusing on a single locus, in this case the 
. bathroom, I may be able to sketc_h out the sort of 
interactive relations that . obtain between our con-
cepts. o( nature, culture, and self. 
The bathroom itself may at first glance appear 
to be an odd choice, and an exploration of these 
issues around this locus seem an exercise in obscur-
ity. But this is not the case. The bathroom as a 
collection of ideas sits exactly at the inter-section of 
the conceptual fields delineated by nature, culture 
and self, and affords· a good · vantage point from 
which to view the interaction between these fields. 
Let me briefly explain why this is the case. 'Cul-
ture', or 'civilization', as a concept, can loosely be 
defined as the practices that set humans apart from 
nature. 'Nature' is the collection of objects that are · 
not specific to cultural practice. 'Self' is one way of 
identifying the natural object that takes part in 
culture. These definitions are necessarily vague 
. because they are constantly changing, necessarily 
inter-referential because they define the totality of . 
a dynamic human experience. They are made up as 
they are required: we compose, or constitute, the 
basic elements of our world. · 
. Self for the most part is a concept that is 
defined within culture.7 'The selves so defined are 
. not wholly cultural beings however: they still have 
biologi.cal functions. Historically this has been 
problematic for the maintenance of order. Some 
· cultures have resolved this problem by 'denying the 
fact of defecation: although in Hindu society it is 
common practice to squat and defecate anywhere, 
this is never spoken of, never written about; Chag- . 
ga men pretended at initiation the anus was perma-
nently plugged.8 In contemporary North American 
households; the bathroom is the most biologically-
oriented room, and at least as regards elimination 
functions, at the farthest end from civilization. It is 
where we are most like animals. The categories 
break down. 9 For this reason, the bathroom is an 
interesting crucible for the present exploration .. 
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But I should be clear about motivation: this 
article is . a reaction to the Better Homes and 
Gardens approach to bathrooms (and to rooms 
generally). Better Homes and Gardens features 
the homes of the. rich. Because rich people are seen 
to have a leadership role in North American so-
ciety, the rooms displayed become the objects of 
desire, come to represent the aspirations of the not-
yet-wealthy .10 In the social context the objects of 
desire are laden with symbolic associations, and at 
the level of · this symbolic association, I think a 
distinct pathological tendency can be detected. A 
society made aware of unconscious movements may 
be inclined to change directions. What is required 
is an exploration of the symbolic content, and how 
it affects the larger ordering of human experience. 
The 'Better Bathroom' 
Let me sketch what I am after. The pool with 
waterfall and ferns that was conjured up in · the 
opening paragraph is one archetype of nature out 
there. Within the ~ities, and most especially with-
in our homes, the space that increasingly bears the 
closest resemblance is the bathroom. Perhaps not 
exactly the bathroom you have in your house right 
now. But our. next bathroom will be like that, the 
bathroom we dream about, especially if we happen 
to read Better Homes and Gardens or some other 
such magazine. And there are many of these maga-
zines, with very high readerships, so I assume the 
image of the 'better bathroom' has some currency. 
It is the 'better bathroom' that is dealt with in this 
paper. 
Bathrooms have not always been accorded 
attention. Until quite recently in North America .the 
privy was outside, and the bathtub was made of tin 
and hauled out and filled once a week. As the batht-
ub was made progressively of cast iron, and later 
pressed s.teel, the bathroom evolved into a separate 
room within the house. As the privy moved in-
doors, it occupied a separate room, the water 
closet. Later, in tract housing, the bathroom typical-
ly conformed tb a 5' x 7' plan, containing both the 
water closet and bathtub. Today's better bathroom 
is larger, and almost certainly has a ceramic tile 
floor. Marble is used in· the better bathroom with 
large mirrors, and the · truly wealthy use opulent 
gold plated faucets, sleek pedestal sinks and toilets, 
enclosed shower stalls, and high volume bathtubs 
with whirl~pool attachments. The small frosted 
window that gave privacy is replaced in the better 
bathroom with picture windows and an expansive 
view. The world outside is invited in as a large 
painting. That painting is the painting of Nature. 
The appearance of plants in the bathropm creates an 
apparent botanical connection between the .space 
outside and the space inside." 
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When Gaston Bachelard first engaged in The 
Poetics of Space the phenomenological geometry 
of the house, he discussed the verticality implied by 
attic and cellar, the intimacy of small places, and 
their archetypes of shell and nest. What Bachelard 
demonstrated was the imme-diacy of symbolic 
content. Within the created structure, symbolic 
relations are set up that are at once deeper and 
richer and more basic to our understanding than the 
struc.tures itself. The walls, in essence, speak to 
us. 11 . Ivan Ill ich compared how many lavatories 
there were in America a hundred years ago and 
now, and reflected on how the increase had affected 
our appreciation of what came out of the tap, till 
the 'mercurial healing liquid' was rendered mere 
'stufr. He ably demonstrates that the myriad 
symbolic attributes of water are subject to historical 
change. 13 But neither of these authors consider the 
spiritual and political landscape of the bathroom, 
although their analyses set the stage for such con-
sideration. 
To begin this task, first consider what makes 
the idea of bathroom unique, what distinguishes it 
from other rooms in the house. Our houses are built 
to resist the vicissitudes of weather, to shelter us 
from air and water. Water however comes into 
houses in many places: the kitchen, the laundry 
room, .but most especially in the bathroom, where 
we duplicate rain in our showers, refreshing our-
selves as the rain refreshes the wild things outside, 
and where we duplicate the lakes and streams in our 
baths, now with wave action from the whirlpool 
attachment. The idyllic gesture of woodland brook 
is caught in the specialty waterfall tap, pool, and 
the exotic fern. The bathroom has become landscape 
-just like that of a forest, and indeed, now with the 
bottled fragrances, it even conjures the same olfac-
tory experience. 
Certainly there are other urban spaces that 
resemble the woodland pool: we find it re-
constructed in the plazas before office towers, and 
with fountains in suburban shopping malls. These 
locations have their successes: pennies and coins 
can be seen even in the shallowest of pools, guar-
anteeing wishes. Yet even though their falling 
waters succeed in blocking out some of the noise, 
we are still confronted with people: these are, after 
all, public spaces (there is perhaps an unintended 
collision of design metaphors here).14 
The bathroom however, is unequivocally. our 
most private location, guarded over by some of our 
most powerful cultural taboos.15 It 1s a place we 
retreat to. The situation that I have described arises 
from historical accident rather than by design. The 
functional combination of what previously had been 
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two rooms with the advent of cost-conscious tract 
housing brought about the juxtaposition of the 
taboos surrounding excretory beha-viour and their 
privacy-maintaining orientation, with the recuperat-
ive elements that have always been associated with 
cleansing and bathing. The result was that what has 
often been a social activity (the French kings and 
other nobles held salon while in the bath, the 
Romans had public bath houses) became surrounded 
with the veil of pri-vacy, and the opportunitY. of 
retreat without the stigma of dirt became possible: 
in short, it became a socially acceptable isolation6 in which the individual was free from interruption.1 
Here, even more than in the mountains (now full of 
hikers), solitude is possible. This solitude is very 
important. 
Nature as presently constituted is something 
that, for the most part, we approach as indivi-
duals. Great significance has been attached to the 
idea of the solitary figure in the face of Nature, 
finding truth, beauty, God, or whatever. Ever since 
Descartes, the French mathematician and philos-
opher who wrote the Discourse on Method in 
1637, it has been individuals who are aware first of 
themselves, then of the world, and finally of other 
people within that world.17 Thus Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, the Enlightenment philosopher, entitled 
his personal reflections Reveries of the Solitary 
Walker, while Thoreau spent his year alone in the 
woods, written up in Walden. 11 But Rousseau and 
Thoreau wrote in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries before the advent of the mo-dern city. 
Nature then included the pastoral, and finding a 
Nature in which to reflect, alone, was not a difficult 
task. More than a century later we have forced a 
conceptual retreat of nature: no longer is the pas-
toral entirely sufficient, especia11y in North Amer-
ica, where the transcendental legacy of John Muir 
leads us into the Sierras. Besides, much of the 
pastoral scene bears the distinct imprint of agribusi-
ness. For the city dwellers of the world, crowded 
together and insulated from what little remains of 
the wild, solitariness - the condition for constituting 
the self - is an increasingly difficult state to attain. 
However, as the boundaries of n;iture are subject to 
revision, a space has been found in the underbelly 
of cultural taboo. Today we retreat to the bathroom. 
The old excretory euphemism of 'nature calls' has 
new literal currency. 
The Political Dialectic 
Having sketched out the role of the better 
bathroom in modern culture as a retreat for intro-
spection, it now remains to explore in more detail 
some of its symbolic elements. By this exploration 
I hope to unveil some of the political and spiritual 
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functions of the better bathroom that hide out of 
sight, lurking around the bend of the wastepipe. 
The grandiose better bathroom is, of course, 
a signifier of wealth. Already bathroom appoint-
ments have become selling features in large houses 
and executive apartments. For a while bathroom 
fixtures imitated the utilitarian cabinetry found in 
the kitchen, but now the pedestal sink is reinstated, 
as pedestal approximates altar. From being the most 
forgotten room in the house, it is now the most 
expensive, demanding materials not found in other 
rooms. The bathroom has become the principal 
signifier of wealth in the modern dwelling. 
There is of course a practical explanation of 
why more inoney is being spent on bathrooms. The 
work day is long, and bathroom provides a respite 
from human contact. I am not immune: after a hard 
day I will relax in my tub, even though I may have 
had a shower that morning: the water goes down 
the plughole almost as clear as it came out the tap. 
Occasionally I read there, but the steam does funny 
things to the pages, so often I simply sit there, old 
bones and worn muscles soothed. There is after all, 
comfort here. It might even be enhanced by win-
dows looking out across the landscape. 
But sometimes we go too far: picture win-
dows in the bathroom are quite probably not a good 
idea. Why this is so requires some explanation, for 
I do not think it is immediately apparent. 
The designer of a better bathroom has an 
incredible array . of images and symbols to manipu-
late, the more powerful for their lack of exercise. 
At the elemental level, there is the play of light 
with water. Also the gurgle, glug of the tub, the 
splash of falling water. There are textural ele-
ments, the possibilities and associations of wood, of 
marble, of glass and mirror, of plaster and enamel, 
of ceramic tile and porcelain. There are the fixtures 
themselves, steeped in social expression. There are 
the accessories and ornaments, designer taps, the 
gold-plated toilet seat, the art, the plants, the colour 
coordinated towels. There are the architectural and 
historical references, composite elements: the bath 
alcove, the shadows of fixtures, the mysterious 
black holes (those pop-up sink plugs hide the reality 
of Hades), the creeping water stains, flaking paint, 
and the simulated effects of mildews, moulds, 
fungi, etc. From all these, moods are created . 
Moods that carry with them the associations we 
have built up around each element, and around each 
composite element; associations that are the depo-
sitaries of value within the culture. Bathrooms are 
thus often the most symbolically interesting room-
s. 
19 Beyond physical form, the better bathroom 
designer designates the patterns of interaction 
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between occupant and fixtures: thus it happens that 
the picture window is next to the bath, and not the 
toilet. 
The better bathroom, designer-wrought, mar-
bled, mirrored and picture-windowed is a scene to 
be looked at rather than lived-in. It is in itself 
beautiful, conforming t~ the Kantian aesthetic, 
rather than acquiring its beauty through the process 
of being lived in. This is beauty made objective, 
and therefore marketable. Indeed, the mirror and 
marble, precisely because of their impervious 
durability, defy living-in.20 The beautiful out-there 
beyond the ego (both the bathroom itself and the 
scene through the picture window) is objectified, is 
untouched, unchanged by human presence. No 
organic relationship between the occupant and room 
is ever entered into. There is no sense of explora-
tion, and little of creation. The only relation left 
between room and occupant is one of aggrandize-
ment, an identification with the values that inhere in 
the mineral purity of glass and marble: the status 
function of the better bathroom becomes apparent. 
Above the altar constituted by the pedestal sink, we 
find the object of worship. Before the mirror, 
naked, the aesthetic constitution of self takes place. 
Narcissism rears its head in the materiality of the 
better bathroom. Are these glorified bathrooms 
mere temples to the body or does the steam get up 
the nostrils and into the mind? 
The Spiritual Dialectic 
In the basin,. in the bathtub, our ritual cleans-
ing take place, washing off the day's psychic 
baggage. It is at this level the proverbial gold-
plated toilet seat is found, for those with truly 
caustic shit. It is this spiritual purification, rather 
than any hygienic imperative (which was met at the 
stage of the tin tub , pitcher and basin, and hand-
pump), that has created the better bathroom. In 
North America cleanliness is next to godliness, and 
our sins disappear down the plughole on their way 
to Hades. The holy liquid that courses from the 
gold-plated taps creates a pool in the better bathtub, 
into which we submerge, to arise baptised. Water 
has always had this symbolic function of purifica-
tion, but it is often context depen-dent. The context 
of the bathroom is given greater legitimacy by 
appeal to existing cultural idylls. Thus the woodland 
glade, a symbol of naturalistic innocence, enters the 
house. And having entered the bathroom it carries 
with it the symbolic function of reflective contem-
plation, so that the bathroom becomes the locus of 
reflective contemplation in the home. Beyond the 
politico-aesthetic constitution before the mirror, 
spiritual constitution takes place in the bathtub. 
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Which brings us back to the picture window. 
The bathroom window is not of itself any different 
than any other window in a house. But once the 
viewer is . able to gaze, reclining and half-
submerged in steamy water, across the landscape 
framed in the window, both landscape and window 
are transformed. Because of its function of spiritual 
regeneration, the vantage of the bathtub is privi-
leged. Because the situation of the bather demands 
inner gazing, the view through the window is 
bracketed. The bather does not enter the flat land-
scape afforded by the pane. The landscape is thus 
devalued as compared with any other landscape 
viewed through any other window. The bathroom 
itself meanwhile, as the crucible of purification, is 
valued more, until the valuation of the semblance of 
nature represented within the bathroom exceeds that 
viewed through the window. The spiritual aspect of 
nature, through a perverse symbolic manipulation 
and architectural happenstance, is reconstituted with 
the home. As Madonna juxtaposes the intimacy of 
boudoir apparel with the transcendental theological 
symbol of the cross by manipulating the symbols 
out of context, so the modern designer better 
bathroom perverts the unity of individual and 
nature. 
Conclusions 
I have described two movements that take 
place in the better bathroom. A politico-aesthetic 
relation that feeds materialistic individualism takes 
place before the mirror. The ego-self is enriched, 
and the connection with organic nature and com-
munitarian culture loosened by the life-defying 
associations brought by marble. And . a spiritual 
relation, whose complex dialectics proceed· from 
the bathtub, that serves to appropriate natural idyll 
as purely cultural form. As I suggested earlier, 
these cases are overstated to make the point. The 
incremental difference these new relations make to 
the boundaries between the conceptual fields oc-
cupied by 'nature', 'culture' and 'self is extremely 
small. However the bathroom is only one locus in 
which such changes can take place. Similar analyses 
of how our practice affects our metaphysics can be 
made for almost every other location, for almost 
every cultural object .. The additive impact of all of 
these changes is likely to be much more significant, 
and can affect the general outlook of society toward 
wilderness. 
The better bathroom is at present the social 
aspiration, and is a reality only f<;>r the few whose 
houses are featured . in Better Homes and 
Gardens. The particular spiritual and political 
dialectics described have not been able to exert an . 
influence yet, despite their role as cultural leaders. 
Material aspirations are frequently adopted without 
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an examination of the environmental consequences, 
which may operate at the level of metaphysics. If 
this is the sort of relation our aspirations incline us 
towards with ·our immediate and personal environ-
ment, what does this say about the possibility of a 
better relation with the·wild environment out there 
beyond the picture window when, perchance, we 
wander out beyond the bathroom? What is required 
is an examination not just of the material impacts of 
our object choices, but also of the metaphysical 
consequences. Today's corporate Pontius Pilate, 
enviro-nmental despoiler, goes home to a whirlpool 
bath instead of washing hands for salvation. Re- . 
sponsibility for the day's deeds goes down the 
plughole, and the scene beyond the thermally 
insulated picture window slowly degrades, like the 
picture of Dorian Gray. 
Notes 
1. Idyll: a poetic form evoking a rustic episode; idol:an image, 
excessively admired and worshipped. The woodland waterfall 
is somehow made discontinuous With the rest of the wood, is 
rendered a human place above all else, and thus occupies the 
dual status of idyll/idol. These words are related through the 
Greek stem 'eidos', meaning form, idea, essence, ideal. 
2. Usage of 'our' and 'we' in this paper is intended to con-
vey the collectiYe aspect of culture. Certainly there is diver-
sity represented in any culture, but what helps define a culture 
is that certain precepts are commonly accessible. Personal 
agreement is therefore not criteria for evaluation of a cultural 
statement, but rather recognition is sufficient. 
3. Before 1800 mountains were almost invariably referred to 
as barren wastelands, and forests were thought of as deserts. 
During the 19th century the Romantics undertook an aesthetic 
and spiritual re-evaluation of mountains, and _in the 20th 
century general society reappraised wilderness areas in the 
context of a scarce and dimini.shing aesthetic resource. For 
further details on history of Anglo-American attitudes toward 
mountains and forests, see Marjorie Nicolson, (1959) Moun-
tain Gloom and Mountain Glory: the aesthetics of the 
infinite. Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca; Kieth Thomas, (1983) 
Man and the Natural ·World: Changing Attitudes in 
England 1500-1800 . . Penguin, Harmondsworth. 425pp.; 
Clarence Glacken, (1967) Traces on the Rhodian Shore: 
nature and culture in Western thought from ancient times 
to the end of the eighteenth century. Univ. California Press, 
Berkeley. 763pp. ; and Roderick Nash, (1973) Wilderness and 
the American Mind, 2nd Ed. Yale Univ. Press, New Haven. 
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There is a vast literature documenting cultural specificity of 
other idealized landscapes. 
4. Dark.holes and drains still seem to hold great fascination 
for small children. Adults in North American culture tend to 
ignore the symbolic content of water, or have lost awareness 
of it. In all classical cultures that I am aware of, the .symbolic 
attributes of rivers and the spiritual properties of flowing water 
were of major significance. The rivers of classical mythology 
typically carry witb them the residues of human folly and :~in. 
Charon the boatman ferried the dead across the river Styx to 
Hades. The Lethe was a river of Hades which caused oblivion 
· and forgetfulness when drunk. Early Christians waited on the 
banks of the Jordan for transport to heaven: The Ganges, holy 
river for Hindus, contains a spirit river, the Saraswati that 
purifies the spirit. For more on this subject see Ivan Illich 
(1985) H20 and the Waters of Forgetfulness: Reflections on 
the Historicity of 'Stuff'. Hey dey Books, Berkeley. 92pp., 
esp. p.30. 
5. Ivan Illich, 1120 and the Waters of Forgetfubiess. See 
csp. pp.75-76. · · 
6. Hans Peter Duerr (trans. F. Goodman) (1985) Dreamtime: 
Concerning the Boundary Between Wilderness and Civiliza-
tion. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 462pp. This remarkable piece 
of scholarship, focusing mainly on the medieval European 
concepts, describes how various iterations of this wildemcss/-
civilization distinction are central to the identity of social 
formations. 
7. It is awkward, although not impossible, to talk of animal 
selves; when we do so we are realigning the boundaries of the 
concepts. This is a case in point: the linguistic practice of 
talking of animal selves redefines the concepts without our 
having to consider the root concepts directly. 
8. Mary Douglas (1966) Purity and Danger: an analysis of 
the concepts of pollution and taboo. Routledge and Kegan 
Paul Ltd., London. 188pp. See p.124, p.163. 
9. For a full exposition of the importance of preserving 
categories, see Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger, esp. 
pp.114-128. 
10. This relation is important: only those cultural changes that 
gain legitimacy as proper objects of desire are able to affect 
·lhc general ordering. Some luxury objects, such as mirrors on 
the bedroom ceiling, arc viewed as aberrant, and do not affect 
the general ordering. 
11. While plants are also found in other rooms, the delib-
erate placing of organic matter in the bathroom marks a move 
away from the Victorian obsession with bathroom sterility. 
12. Gaston Bachelard (trans. Maria Jolas), (1964) The Poetics 
of Space. Beacon Press, Bosto11. xxxv + 241pp. (first 
published in French, 1958 as La Poetique. de L'espace, 
Presses Univ. des Prance). In popular culture these relations 
emerge in the haunted house and the horror movie, where the 
audience supplies the associations that make the attic and the 
cellar frightening. The creature that emerges simultaneously 
from the drain and the subconscious (sec for example Michael 
Jackson's Thriller video) is another case more relevant to the 
present exploration. 
13. Illich overstates the case in H20 and the Waters of 
Forgetfulness to make his point, arguing that water has 
become a mere cleaning fluid, and has lost its spiritual power. 
I also overstate the case in the opposite direction. In both cases 
overstatement is necessary because of the subtlety of the 
phenomena being described. 
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14. Ivan Illich's H20 and the Waters of Forgetfulness 
addresses this aspect of the symbolic use of water. 
15. The taboos that allow for privacy in the bathroom are 
treated descriptively by ALexander Kira (1976) The Bath-
room, 2nd Ed .. Viking Press, New York. 272pp.; and 
theoretically by Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger. 
16. For a dcacription of the;. 3ocilll a:~pc<:t of bnthins see 
Lawrence Wright (1960) Clean and Decent: the fascinating 
history or the bathroom and the WC. Univ. Toronto Press, 
Toronto, 282pp. Unfortunately Wright's study terminates with 
the Victorian period. 
17. Rene Descartes (1637) Discourse on Method. Descartes 
is held responsible for the modern dualism of mind and body, 
of human culture and nature. In his "cogito ergo sum", only 
the self could be immediately known, and all else had to be 
doubted, particularly the spiritual aspect of anything non-
human. For more on Descartes' influence on the relations 
between nature, culture and . self see, for example, Morris 
Berman (1981) TheRe-enchantment of the World . Cornell 
Univ. Press, Ithaca. 357pp., esp. chapter 1. 
18. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (trans. P. France) (1979) 
Reveries of the Solitary Walker. Penguin, Harmondsworth. 
155pp. (first publ. 1792). Rousseau observed that "These hours 
of solitude and meditation are the only ones in the day when 
I .am completely myself and my own master, with nothing to 
· distract or hinder me, the only ones when I can truly say that 
I am what nature meant me to be". p.35; Henry David 
Thoreau, (1960) Walden and Civil Disobedience. Signet, New 
York. 256pp. (first publ. 1854). 
19. Except for those which go wholly overboard on marble 
and mirror, and thereby demonstrate poor grasp of the symbols 
of the modern temple, in prematurely alienating the subject. 
My own favourite bathroom designs recollect the Matisse 
chapel, the Bhuddist Temple, and the Roinan Temple. 
. 20. Marble is the material of choice for mausoleums. During 
the Romantic period, marble was a symbol of mineral purity, 
because it did not degrade as organic forms did. This is 
termed the death-seeking tendency in Romanticism. 
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Infatuation 
i watched her dip her hand 
into the deep dark blue lake, 
sipping, while staring into the cold depths 
watching her rippling reflection. 
Blue sky, a harsh northern sun 
beating strongly, struggling to hand warmth 
to this permanently cold stronghold, 
The trees bravely stand, 
Ways of Being 
for John A. Livingston 
Oh, let me· see the world with a falcon's eyes: 
Height and speed, the sound of failing; 
the flash of killing, the smell of flight; 
let me be the world with those eyes: 
let me know the power, 
let me feel the way. 
Oh, let me see the world with a wolf's nose: 
Stealth and mapping, the colour of pursuit; 
the scent of belonging, the song of night; 
let me be the world with that nose: 
let me know the power, 
let me feel the way. 
Oh, let me see the world with a dolphin's ears: 
Depth and texture, the odour of water; 
the music of space, the image of free; 
let me be the world with those ears: 
let me know the power, 
let me feel the way. 
Louise Fabiani 
and here, there the granite juts its long knobby fingers 
into the lakes, 
making rivers rush roaring over windswept rocks, 
the cool breeze hushing the sound. 
i pull myself out of the wind, 
once more i look round slowly 
grasping my paddle 
a deep sigh escapes, i breath deeply of 
the cool breeze, 
i look at her, she at me, 
the paddles dip 
quietly 
we slide on our way. 
rolf struthers 
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Lichens 
for 
Christopher Dewdney 
I. A _glacier-
etched round of granite: exposed 
Canadian Shield; on this are spread 
the truest pioneers: 
(sea-green, lime-green, black, mustard-yellow) 
lichens. No soil, no welcome prepared 
for those who lack roots to seek; a chemical 
fondness hugs them to the rock, flattened 
in a prudent sort of intimacy, 
yet proud, timeless - the fossil remains 
of water drops 
tumbled from rainbows. 
II. To be first-
how venerated, then ignored are they 
who invade dead atom clusters with the flicker 
of DNA, its quest: to pass the beacon. A rock 
will become soil, will become alive - as suffused 
with protoplasm as with dust and water, and then 
it can all be recognized 
as a miracle. 
III. Early, alone, yet 
not alone, the stark stains of life 
are mutual dependencies, 
of the dark-loving and the dark-fearing: 
SYMBIOSIS-
a team that redefines the unit. 
Tfhe individudal o.r&anism is a question ~ 
o names an ongms. 
It is the oldest story and the one 
·most recently understood: cooperation 
is the crux of complexity, and complexity 
the stamp of the divine. 
IV. Tucked away from wind and sun, 
another secret: protection will yield 
a bold reach for the third dimension. 
A bleached-bone lichen filaments into a forest 
several centimetres high, a panic of reticulation, 
a dried-out mass of brain tissue. 
In this dendritic huddle of interlock, 
a dream forms. 
The lichens are willing an entire ecosystem 
into premature self awareness. 
Louise Fabiani 
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The Modern Battlefront of Natural History 
and the Emergence of Animal Heroes 
The popular nature writer and conservationist 
Ernest Harold Baynes (1868-1925) was instrumental 
in bringing the issue of the place of animals in war 
to the attention of nature historians in the United 
States. In Animal Heroes of the Great War, 1 
Baynes presented a general overview of the use of 
animals in the Allied war effort of World War I, 
describing the service of horses, camels, mules, 
donkeys, oxen, dogs and pigeons. As a representa-
tive of Harper's magazine, he travelled through 
England, France, Belgium, Italy, Egypt and Pales-
tine from the winter of 1919 to the summer of 
1920, collecting material for Animal Heroes and 
"Our Animal Allies in the World War," which 
appeared in Harper's in 1921.2 
Baynes, then, was no ordinary war correspon-
dent. While his place in 'environmental history' 
remains to be elaborated, I will not attempt a com-
prehensive treatment of his work in this paper .3 
Rather, I will use his writings on the place of 
animals in the army to develop a critical perspec-
tive on the accounts of the 'heroic acts' which 
pigeons and dogs performed as members of the 
Allied forces in WWI and, to a lesser degree, in 
wwn: 
This paper, therefore, is as much a study in the 
history of ideas as a theoretical investigation of the 
practice of anthropomorphism. The work of Baynes 
may be shown to provide a poignant counterpoint to 
the claim that, as Leesa Fawcett puts it, "anthropo-
morphism stands as an example of the realization 
that we are an integral and continuous part of the 
living world. "5 The animal heroes theme reveals 
some of the extreme consequences, the dark under-
side if you will, of this 'realization.' 
Burroughs-Roosevelt-Baynes 
In the early years of this century, especially 
those of Theodore Roosevelt's first term as presi-
dent of the United States (1901-05), the naturalist 
John Burroughs launched several attacks in the 
by Gary Genosko· 
pages of The Atlantic Month1y6 against a kind of 
nature writing which he called "Sham Natural 
History." Burroughs maintained that the populari-
zer of nature adventure stories, Rev. William J. 
Long and the naturalist and illustrator Ernest 
Thompson Seton, had published animal stories 
which were to a large extent fictional rather than 
true observations of the animal kingdom as based on 
"natural facts." Burroughs believed that by using 
the term 'true' to describe and to defend their 
stories, Long and Seton were misleading their 
readers: "True as romance, true in their artistic 
efforts, true in their power to entertain the young 
reader, they certainly are; but true as natural 
history they as certainly are not. "7 In essence, Long 
and Seton were 'charged' with corrupting the minds 
of the young and it was through this legal metaphor 
that the influential Burroughs, with the support of 
Roosevelt, gave rhetorical notice to those who did 
not recognize anthropomorphism as an 'offense'. 
When Roosevelt wrote the "Preface" to 
Baynes' Wild Bird Guests (1915) six years after 
his second term as president (1905-09), the 
Baynes-Roosevelt ligature was established in the 
name of the preservation of bird life: a patriotic, 
economically sound and acceptable brand of aes-
thetic interest, in that order.' In the "Preface" 
Roosevelt acknowledged a debt to the "missionary 
work" of Baynes in establishing some 300 bird 
sanctuaries in the country. Upon Roosevelt's death 
in 1919, Baynes published a short eulogy in verse, 
"Death and Roosevelt, d therein paying homage to 
the so-called 'Great Conservationist'. 
When Baynes' book, Animal Heroes of the 
~reat War, appeared posthumously in 1925, Owen 
Wister, the author of the introduction, did not fail 
to again place Baynes in the Burroughs-Roosevelt 
camp. Wister states that Baynes "rose to the first 
rank in his chosen field; the peer of Burroughs and 
of Muir--indeed of any among those who observe 
and interpret the wilderness with imagination and 
accuracy. "10 He was quick to add that Baynes "was 
* Gary GeMsko is an alumnus of F.E.S., currently working on his doctorate in Social and Political Thought at York University. An 
earlier version of this paper was wrilten under the direction of John Livingston whik Gary was aJ the Facul!y and iJ is part of an ongoing 
investigation in the cu/Jural studies of animals in which he is engaged. 
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always literal when he spoke or wrote of animals." 
In fact, for Wister, Baynes had an indefinable 
quality which enabled· him "to write of animals 
without mawkishness, II avoiding the habit of excess-
.. ive humanization and anthropomorphism. 
In the exalted company of Burroughs, the 
American nature writer John · Muir (who was a 
model of legitimacy in the eyes of Burroughs), and 
Roosevelt, who had given Baynes a letter of intro-
duction which facilitated his research in Europe and 
Africa, Baynes had achieved the status of a 'true' 
nature writer and a patriotic conservationist! 1 • . 
Animal War .Heroes 
Although Wister was careful to align Baynes 
with the Burroughs-Roosevelt offensive, the theme 
of the animal here which Baynes used owed as 
much to the focus of Seton as to the patriotic and 
anti-anthropomorphic mandates of Roosevelt and 
Burroughs. In Animal Heroes (1905), Seton . 
defined a hero as II an individual of unusual gifts and 
achievements whether it be man or animal ... and it 
is the histories of such that appeal to the imagin-
ation and to the hearts of those who hear them. "12 
The adventure story with an animal as its central 
character is an enduring part of popular culture. 
Inde.ed, thirty-three years after Seton, Harper Cory 
published his version of Animal Heroes. Cory's 
tales of non-human heroes and heroines were based 
on "wild animals which displayed courage and 
patience when confronted with circumstances 
inimical to their freedom or existence. "13 
By adjusting the scope of the definition of the 
hero, an individual animal could be seen to distin-
guish itself · from others through heroic acts. The 
notion of an "animal hero II became an interpretive 
framework with which to render the exploits · of 
outstanding individuals in the context of an adven-
ture story. In .the work of Baynes, however, there 
was no need to create a sense of adventure since the 
· war itself provided the 'plot'. Moreover, he did 
not have to fabricate animal heroes on the battle-
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field since he found that many pigeons and dogs had 
in fact been rewarded for their brave service. Thus, 
the war records easily lent themselves to the animal 
heroes theme . 
Baynes observed that: 
The French used in a:ll about thirty thousand 
[pigeons] and the birds that performed distin· 
guished service, or showed unusual gallantry in 
the line of duty, were rewarded the Croix de 
Guerre (}r the Croix Militaire. Diplomas, with 
the citations were issued and kept at the head-
quarters of the Fre·nch Pigeon Service, and 
because pigeons cannot wear medals on their 
breasts, special bands with the colors of the 
decorations were made for their legs .. .'• 
The British Pigeon Service, established in 1914, 
and the American · Pigeon Service, which did not 
·see action until 1917, did not adopt the 
vanguardism of the French recompense as ·such. 
Although it was not until the Second World War 
that ·Britain engaged in such a practice (the People's 
Dispensary for Sick Animals donated the Dickin 
Medal for heroic· animals) and, in the United States, 
the taxidermists of the Smithsonian Institution and 
the Hall of Honor of the American PigeOn Service 
held a monopoly over the creation of stuffed and 
mounted pigeon heroes, the famous British birds 
were not neglected. 
. The animal enthusiast Jilly Cooper notes that 
in World War I "pigeons who were wounded in 
·active ·service were promptly pensioned off"15 as 
pets. Baynes relates that a group. of soldiers who 
were rescued from the North Sea as a result of a 
message delivered by · their final bird (which r 
dropped dead from exhaustion upon delivering the 
call for help), "took the little body, had it carefully 
mounted, and today there is to be seen in the head-
quarters of that aero squadron a neat glass case, 
containing a · beautiful .pigeon, and beneath it the 
inscription, 'A Very Gallant Gentleman'. •>~ 6 · 
The mode of characterization which Baynes 
used in relating the histories of the animals which 
were eligible for the status of war hero (almost 
exclusively racing homer pigeons and dogs) was 
that of the self-sacrificing individual, especially the . 
tragic .hero. This way of delivering the service of 
pigeons and dogs is based on the idea, firmly estab-
lished and encouraged in the military context, of 
self-sacrifice in the name of a higher or greater 
cause. Baynes differs from Seton in his use of th~ 
hero theme since in the military context it is strictly 
the case that pigeons and dogs are rewarded for 
serving humaris rather than for acts which pertain 
to their conspecifics or to self-preservation. 
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In his discussion of pigeon heroes, Baynes 
noted that "the loss of a leg or an eye was quite a 
commonplace occurrence, and such an injury in 
itself was not enough to prevent the bird from 
finishing the task it had been set to do. "17 But it 
was as a result of coming from 'proud stock' that 
the American blue check cock Lord Adelaide, a 
famous tanker bird (a bird released from a tank as 
a means of communication) "went on, weak and 
covered with blood," to deliver his message!8 The 
heroic bird is given a will to serve and to triumph 
over adversity and has as its goal the successful 
completion of a 'mission' or, in the case of Lord 
Adelaide, a tradition to uphold. The will to serve 
indicates that it is not merely as a result of instinct 
or training that a bird completes its task. The status 
of hero is irreducible to the importance of the 
message which an animal delivered. For instance, 
Cooper insists that "people tend .to dismiss the 
pigeon's achievement and to say that they all just 
followed a natural instinct to get home as fast as 
possible. But there are courageous pigeons who 
battle on, and others who dally by the way. "19 
Although there has been a shift from wild to 
domesticated animals in the animal heroes theme, in 
both cases an individual (rather than a group or a 
pair) distinguishes itself. The domesticated animal 
serves the human agent who has made certain that 
its natural capacities work toward the cause of the 
war effort. Animals, therefore, cannot serve in the 
war effort unless they become absolutely dependent 
upon their trainers or handlers. For instance, 
Lieutenant-Colonel E.H. Richardson, Commandant 
of the British War Dog School at Shoeburyness in 
Essex, found that many breeds of dogs were un-
suitable for the messenger service because, with 
respect to hounds: 
.. . their absorption in their natural work-the 
temptation to follow the scent of some wild 
creature that had crossed their path, --was 
usually so great, that even if it were possible for 
training to overcome it, the time required was 
better spent on breeds which had--shall we say 
--a broader outlook on life.lD 
In fact, the rigour of the dog school was such that 
"out-and-out slackers, or 'conscientious objectors', 
were given short shrift and sent to the lethal cham-
ber at Battersea. England expects every dog to do 
his [sic] duty! "21 
A general point needs to be considered: the 
so-called 'natural work' of dogs, insofar as such 
'work' concerns other dogs or non-human beings, 
is prohibited by the trainer unless it can be made 
operational for the benefit of the troops. In Ani-
mal Reveille, Richard Dempewolff provides us 
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with a burlesque description of the deployment of a 
liaison dog named Plaisir: 
... there was one risque little war dog specialist 
who played a field all her own. She was a 
seductive French 'fifth columnist' dog named 
Plaisir. It was early in the game when Plaisir 
went into operations, but she did a noble job. 
Nazi hordes were pounding at the Maginot 
Line, and their canine corps was much in 
evidence. Messenger hounds scuttled back and 
forth across the front continuously. The 
Frenchmen sniped at them whenever they could, 
but it was like trying to hit a white jackrabbit 
zigzagging over the snow. Then a soldier with 
a fine sense of humour and a keen imagination 
happened to think ofPlaisir, a small liaison dog 
of dubious ancestry who bad reached her 'time' 
and was out of service temporarily. 
That afternoon Plaisir was unleashed and 
sent out across the front to practice her wiles. 
Early in the evening the men saw her coming 
back, trotting saucily along, her bushy tail 
curled naughtily over her rump. Behind her, 
trailing a long queue, were a round dozen 
well-trained German messenger dogs, devotedly 
following the little Mata Hari into captivity .11 
There is perhaps no clearer example of sexism in 
anthropomorphism. Dempewolff achieves a bur- · 
lesque effect by sexually exploiting the heat of the 
female dog. His description is then supplemented 
with a stereotype of French women. . This 
ethnocentric and sexist passage is perfectly compat-
ible with military operationality. In this example, 
Plaisir's "natural work" was made operational in 
order to lure the "well-trained German dogs" away 
from their duties. It is in this sense that the prohib- . 
itions concerning "natural work" may be lifted and 
used to tactical advantage. Yet, Plaisir is also 
de-professionalised--she will become no hero, no 
"well-trained" war dog. Her "work" is "pleasure," 
and this reduction is only an extension of her "du-
bious ancestry." But still, a hallmark of anthro-
pomorphic description is that sex is pleasure for 
animals. 
Domestication entails the absolute dependence 
of an animal (in anthropomorphic terms, the willing 
dependence) on its trainer and the reduction or, in 
some cases, redirection of sensory subtleties. The 
successfully engineered war animal can distinguish 
itself if it exhibits the behavioral patterns that it has 
been taught. A messenger dog is deemed to be 
heroic if it suffers and overcomes battle wounds or 
similar obstacles. If a dog is able to overcome 
injuries incurred on the ·battlefield in active service · 
and, in completing its mission, exhaust itself, 
ultimately expiring at its destination, then it is 
afforded the status of a tragic hero. For example, 
Baynes and Cooper describe how Commandant 
Raynal's "last pigeon, badly mangled, dropped dead 
as he delivered his message" to Verdun and as a 
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result was awarded the Legion d'Honneur.23 Both 
authors recount the exploits of the messenger dog 
Von Kluck who died at the feet of the officer 
· awaiting his message.24 Baynes tells us that the 
British bred pigeon No. 2709 was given up for lost 
since a night had passed from the time that it had 
been dispatched from tq.e front to divisional head-
quarters some nine miles away, but: 
She was not dead--it was not time to die yet. 
Somewhere she had lain out in the wet all night, 
and in the grey of the morning, she staggered 
into the loft, and died before the officer on duty 
could read the message she had brought~ 
The downfall of a tragic animal hero is not the 
result of a tra.gic flaw in its personality, as we find 
in the definition of a tragic human hero. As we 
have seen, a domesticated animal may be said to be 
flawed in the military context if its behaviour 
cannot be made operational for a specific task. The 
force of the story of the tragic animal hero does not 
emerge through the use of the term 'tragic', but is 
established on the basis of two invariable features: 
i) the· messenger completes its mission and; ii) 
expires at its destination after having overcome an 
obstacle (shrapnel, predators, weather conditions, 
etc.). The "rewards" of domestication may be a 
medal, a posthumous toast, pet or veteran status, a 
noble death, or a pat on the head. 
Toward a Critical Anthropomorphism 
War animals are referred to as 'soldiers,' 
'veterans,' 'heroes' and 'allies.' The leVel of an-
thropomorphism in , the military use of animals is 
extremely high. Primarily, however, it is the pro-
cess of domestication which brings animals into the 
human social unit as creatures designed to suit our 
emotional needs and living conditions which war-
rants the practice of anthropomorphism. 
It takes almost no effort to attribute human · 
qualities to the animals we have domesticated and 
socialized. It is not surprising that we do so since 
anthropomorphism is an essential feature of the way 
we comport ourselves with domesticates. John 
Livingston remarks in a personal note that "when I 
am teased for behaving anthropomorphically, my 
rejoinder is that as a person that is the only way I 
can behave. "26 Anthropomorphic description is 
appropriate as an insight into the practices which 
mediate our relations with domesticates and, more 
generally, as. the self-reflective recognition that 
anthropomorphization is a prevalent if not constitut-
ive feature of human knowledge. 27 In this ·sense, the 
absence of anthropomorphism may be ·seen as an 
aberration which is indicative of an insensitivity to 
the statUs of domesticated animals and our influence 
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over them. An anthropomorphism which is critical 
must acknowledge its own prejudices. 
In the work of Baynes, we do not find a 
critical, reflective anthropomorphism. Instead, it is 
a straightforward orientation. I do not mean that it 
is only anthropocentric, as if this term explained 
itself. The value judgments which an unreflective 
anthropomorphism carries give rise to the belief 
that the failure of some animals to satisfy unrealistic 
human expectations results from their uncoopera~ive 
attitudes toward certain human goals, in this case 
military goals. As we have seen, this belief was a 
reason to send dogs to the "lethal chamber." It is 
supremely anthropomorphic to claim that the failure 
of some dogs to "broaden their horizons" for King 
and Country is a renegade tendency, a breakdown 
of loyalty, yet this claim has nothing· to contribute 
to a sensitivity to domesticates. 
What is so deceptive about the use of the ani-
mal war heroes theme is that it seems to provide 
evidence of a caring approach to animals, despite 
the excesses it allowed. It represented a moral tri-
umph of sorts over the conditions of war and a way 
·to legitimize the expenditure of animal charges. It 
would be inhumane not to award animals if they 
displayed military virtues . But a large number of 
animal heroes were tragic heroes, and thus "re-
ceived" awards posthumously; it is difficult to 
imagine what a pigeon might make of a diploma 
bearing its "name." 
Anthropomorphism is fraught with raCism, 
sexism, nationalism, militarism, etc. 
Anthropomorphism is also selective. The animals 
capable of performing the human tasks that were 
necessary for th~ survival of soldiers but impossible 
for them to perform proved to be the best candi-
dates. Pigeons and dogs were given a special status 
over camels and oxen, for instance, and awarded 
with tokens of their military use-value. While all 
war animals are chattel of military proprietors, 
those that function as soldiers and develop affection 
for their handlers receive the highest "honours" of 
anthropomorphism; those that merely toil, appear to 
respond negatively to humans, exhibit little affec-
tion and have a limited use-value, receive little. 
The animal heroes theme should not be dis-
missed as a historical curiosity, an affectation of a 
mid-twentieth century war culture. It has genuine 
heuristic value since it expresses the ambiguity of 
anthropomorphism as a means of ennobling animals .. 
This ambiguity--glorification and justification for 
the injury and death of animals--reveals to us that 
anthropomorphism has a dark side. It is the task of 
a critical anthropomorphism to uncover the extent 
and the depth of the contradictory goals which 
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guide . our relations with domesticates, and to 
analyze our power to categorize, terrorize and 
reward animals when they mirror .certain aspects of 
ourselves, including our follies. 
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Domination and Preservation: 
Reflections on Wildlife Cinematography 
Contemporary wildlife documentaries, geared 
for the television market, exhibit a recurrent pat-
tern: their narratives tend to emphasize the preda-
tory pursuit of wild animals. In large part this 
problem is a consequence of the masculinist and 
scientistic legacies which wildlife filmmakers have 
taken over from the natural sciences, in order to 
seek legitimacy for this genre. 1 Other (even contra-
dictory) forces also come into play in the produc-
tion of wildlife documentaries, namely those arising 
from · commercial demands. The differences be-. 
tween wildlife programming and entertainment 
specials are at times only ones of modality. Thus, 
·while the contemporary writings of deep ecology 
and ecofeminism very clearly reflect alternate ideal.<; 
of human interconnectedness with the nonhuman 
environment, wildlife documentaries seem com-
pelled to answer to two rather "environmentally 
unsympathetic" task-masters: objective science and 
entertainment. 
In general, environmentalists have failed to 
launch a critique of wildlife documentaries, choos-
ing instead to overlook the embeddedness of most 
programs in the very assumptions to which radical 
environmentalism must necessarily be opposed. Of 
the few dissenting views about wildlife documen-
taries on record, not surprisingly one of the earliest 
I have found comes from Adolf Portmann--the 
European biologist noted for his · radical revisioning 
of biological· thought.2 Amidst the ecstatic accounts 
of the achievements of filmmakers such as Cousteau · 
in the late 1950s,3 the following passage from a 
1959 essay by Portmann stands out as a rare admo-
nition of the perils of a disembodied eye: 
The present flood of illustrated publications 
threatens to increase to an · enormous extent the 
nuinber of the visually ignorant and the visually 
apathetic. · . 
It may sound strange to emphasize this 
danger at a time when an unparalleled flood of . 
nature . documentation is overwhelming us--
books, magazines, films, television--photographs 
everywhere, everywhere possibilities of seeing as 
never before. Can this actually be a menace? 
Yes, precisely because this deluge of pictures 
rarely encourages a genuine relationship with 
nature, and because any true education of the 
spirit lies in a totally different direction. • 
by·Margot La Rocque* 
Portmann's message is plain: photographic repro-
duction wi11 fatally weaken our appreciation of an 
original nature. 
In this paper, I present a few tentative 
reflections on wildlife documentaries which seek to 
expand the above critique of this genre that 
Portmann initiated. In particular, I. begin · with a 
discussion of the figure of the wildlife fi lmmaker as 
a "personality" or exemplary witness. Indeed, few · 
of these figures (who often appear on screen as .. 
well) are scientists, despite their appeals to scien-
tific ideology. Their appeal lies, on the other hand, 
in their enthusiastic amateurism, their fierce inde-
pendence, their mastery of technique, and the 
heroism of their sweeping vision. I argue that as 
mythic constructions, the careers of such film-
makers resolve antagonisms between domination 
and preservation (much in the same way that series 
such as Mutual of Omaha's Wild Kingdom are 
an attempt to reconcile the conquest of the frontier 
with the effort of saving it). 
To begin to understand how such a persona 
is constructed--a pers.ona which in turn shapes many 
of our everyday relationships with wild nature--! 
will consider some of the various ways in which the 
single white male occ~pies nature in wjldlife docu-
:mentaries, and advertises himself as such. But • 
rather than generalize, I begin with a brief look at 
one such document of self-promotion: Lights 
Action Africa! (1980). s This film, co-produced by 
Alan 'Root and Aubrey Buxton, is about the cele-
brated careers of Root himself (and his wife Joan) -
-makers of such well-known wildlife documentaries 
as The Enchanted Isles (1967) and The Year of 
the Wildebeest (1976). 
The One Who Looks at Wild Animals 
. . 
Lights Action Africa! may well be the 
epitome of idealizing film biographies about the 
ones who look at wild animals. This 60-minute 
. film follows the Roots through a variety of domestic 
and professional situations. Scenes of the Roots at 
work on various films, and relaxing and doing 
chores around camp, are intercut with extraordinary 
footage shot for their wildlife documentaries. The 
·Margot La Rocque recently completed her Master in Environmental Studies. She is currently a doctoral candidate in Sociology at York. 
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resulting images of wildlife are marked, above all, 
by indications of their normal invisibility to the 
layperson's naked eye. 
The Root legend occupies a unique · place in 
the history of wildlife filmmaking. Indeed, it is a 
legend identified almost solely with Alan. Alan's 
public image is in fact a composite of images: of 
teacher, adventurer, husband, carpenter, superb 
pilot, risk-taker, naturalist, and conservationist. In 
the first few minutes of Lights Action Africa!, the 
viewer is treated to a dazzling array of exploits, as 
the Roots rise above·the terrain in a hot-air balloon, 
take a coffee break in the middle of a remote river, 
jack up a four-wheel drive vehicle, buzz over 
treetops in a small plane, climb a rope ladder, share 
a drink with some "natives," and film underwater -
- to list just a few. The ensuing film primarily 
documents how the Roots manoeuver their way 
around the physical barriers that stand between the 
wild creatures of the continent of Africa and their 
camera lens. The Roots are clearly privy to knowl-
edge and experiences not accessible to most. 
Almost ·immediately, however, the commen-
tary informs us that in this idyllic, exciting world, 
the Roots share the fate of all human creatures: to 
"try to keep fit," to "try to keep clean," and to "try 
to keep 'regular.'"6 Taken literally, this is of 
course true. But the juxtaposition of commentary 
and images here wields an irony. Rather than show 
scenes which might seem synonymous with domes-
ticity, the viewer is treated to glimpses of a life 
probably very different from their own: Alan 
jogging past a group of elephants, and bathing in a 
river with an audience of wild creatures; Joan 
tossing a roll of toilet paper from a make-shift out-
house towards a lion. These vignettes all serve to 
emphasize not in fact the similaiity of their lives to 
our own, but the marked contrast. The Roots are, 
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most defmitely, a breed apart. 
However, there is at least one sense in 
which this semblance that is drawn to the rest of 
our lives is correct. This husband-wife "team" is 
hitched to the familiar theme of the sexual division 
of labour, with Alan the professional, and Joan his 
help-mate. In the film's initial shot, Alan peers 
through a long lens in a torrential rainstorm. He 
continues filming while his tea cup and saucer, 
perched precariously on a log, fiils up with drops of 
rain. A female figure (Joan) comes into frame, 
picks up the cup and saucer, exits frame, and a 
moment later returns the tea cup to the log-~this 
time with the saucer placed on top. Alan, mean-
while, has not removed his eye from the lens. 
Joan's small civilizing gesture in this wilderness 
will likely go unnoticed in the shadow of Alan's 
much more significant task. 
This sexual division of labour informs 
almost every scene of the Roots at work and at 
home in the camp, and is underscored by the shots 
which introduce Alan and Joan individually: Alan 
is lathered with shaving cream; Joan bakes bread. 
These images place Alan and Joan on opposite sides 
of the sexual divide, although the commentary 
seems at first unwilling to acknowledge this: 
In the short time that they spend at their 
Lake Naivasha home, Joan does what she 
can, with a little help from her [animal] 
friends. But she's happiest when living in 
a tent, and is not reall~ into domesticity and 
the comforts of home. 
Yet again, images soon belie words. There are 
several shots of Joan gardening, sewing, and cook-
ing, always with "orphaned" animals at her side. 
Then in the first major sequence in the field, after · 
several aborted attempts at filming hippos under-
water from floating "coffins" and cages, male and 
female are finally explicitly distinguished as an 
arduous task approaches: 
Now they knew that there was only one way 
to get their pictures: they would have to 
take the plunge. 
Alan is a stimulus at it. He rel-
ishes this sort of situation-where danger and 
fear are finely balanced . A project is not 
interesting unless the odds are against him. 
Joan's philosophy is simpler: if 
Alan is going to do these things, it's less 
worrying and much more fun to do them 
with him . So , it was the two of them who 
swam toward the unknown in Mzima.' 
Throughout Lights Action Africa!, Joan is 
variously set up as target for a snake's poison; as 
parent to the smallest hornedbill chick (whom she 
"' tops up' ... so it doesn't get left behind"); and 
as the one who can get closest to the nonhuman (by 
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mimicking the rasping feeling of a fish that cleans 
algae from the hippo's hide, Joan is "able to scratch 
a two-ton hippo's bottom"). These scenes construct 
woman as closer to "nature" than man. Teamwork 
is perhaps a misnomer here, for in spite of the 
assistance Joan offers, the persona Alan projects 
seems to hinge on his singularity and self-suffi-
ciency. The figure of Joan serv~s primarily to 
mark the gap between Alan's masculine pr_ivilege 
and authority, and the closely interconnected do-
mains of "the feminine" and "nature." 
In the closing moments of the film, the com-
mentator asks rhetoric~lly: "So, what is it the 
Roots have that makes them the 'A team'?" 
Well, for a start, they're obviously just that--a 
team. T_hey have a pioneering sort of courage ... 
and patience. Tenacity ... and pati~nce. Special 
skills. Lots of energy ... and patience. But 
above all, they have a deep understanding and 
love for the creatures they film. And for Afri-
ca.' 
But here is the crux of the problem. The film 
ends with a confused appeal to the ·simultaneous 
threat to wilderness and the inevitability of extinc-
_tion. Accordingly, in one breath the narrator 
concentrates on the Roots' aspiration to save what 
is fast disappearing, and with the next, the pastness 
of a great Africa is a given: 
They will need all these qualities in the future, 
for their kind of Africa is fast disappearing. 
Their films, and others like them, have done 
much to show the world what a tragic loss that 
would be. 
Alan and Joan will go on filming, and will 
continue to share their wonderment and under-
standing. And who better to record, for all time, 
what used to be ... in Africa?10 • 
So much for saving animals then. The urge to 
save wildlife has been translated into the urge to 
record it: the preservation of a life by its represen-
tation. 11 The Roots may well be an "A team," as 
the commentary exhorts, but following the logic of 
the marketplace (where images of wildlife are a 
commodity like any other), the exchange value of 
their work reflects the increasing rarity of the 
phenomena that they photograph. 
Survival of the Fittest 
I recall that at the screening of Lights Action 
Africa! at a gathering of wildlife film professionals 
I attended in Bath, England in 198112, the 
auditorium was abuzz with excitement at Alan 
Root's presence . Confessed Eamon de Buitlear (a 
colleague of Root's) on coming face-to-face with 
this legendary figure: 
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I was quite confident at coming to talk and 
show my bit of film. Now panic has set in! 
I'd never seen Alan Root before, and here 
he is himself- and on film! This fantastic 
film-maker, tearing around the jungle, fully 
equipped with small plane, a generator, a 
whole boxful of every lens ever made for 
the Arriflex, a battery of lights, not to 
mention a wife thrown in as snake baiter 
and hippo fodded' 
What is striking about this statement (aside 
from the fact that it vastly depreciates the accom-
plishments of de Buitlear who, labouring on a tiny, 
intensively cultivated island, has himself produced 
some of the most resplendent wildlife film 
seq_uences I can recall ever seeing14) is the extent to 
whtch it focuses on the sundry trappings of· the 
trade. Indeed, this parapherna1ia is of no possible 
use to a filmmaker whose task it is to document not 
the flora and fauna of the vast continent of Africa, 
but of Ireland. Clearly both the human and nonhu-
man accouterments--wife, vehicles, camera appara-
tus--augment the power of Root in de Buitlear's 
eyes, for in this profession expertise is virtually 
synonymous with the command of technique. But 
it would be a mistake to put such comments down 
simply to de Buitlear's envy or false modesty; the 
embracing issue is surely the advancement, both 
on- and off-screen, of masculine prowess and tech-
nologically intensive t!Ctivity as the very essence of 
conservation practice. 
Such an accord between domination and 
preservation is abundantly documented in literary 
and filmic chronicles of the careers of. wildlife 
filmmakers, and in numerous publicity images 
featuring filmmakers with their gear. The ideologi-
cal force of such accounts and displays of wildlife 
filmmakers with their gear may be seen to lie in 
their apparent reconciliation of the human drive to 
master Nature with a technologically guided pro-
cess of saving it. This suggests that, despite what-
ever desires are peaked by the lure of danger and 
the promise of omnipotence, this seemingly primor-
dial contest is now offered in service of a greater 
and contemporary ideal: wildlife p~eservation. 
The wildlife filmmaker appropriates nature, but 
allegedly solely for ameliorative purposes. 
The immense burden of this critical assign-
ment is iconically represented in numerous publicity 
-shots in which the filmmaker stands as a 
metonymic representation of "one who looks at 
wild animals." TyP.ically, he deftly shoulders his 
weighty apparatus while surveying an expansive or 
formidable terrain, or, in another favored pose, 
pauses for a moment from his intense investiga-
tions through the camera lens to look toward yet 
another lens, thereby evoking the phantom witness 
who will eventually share in an imagined exchange 
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with a true champion of the wild. The expression 
is always stoic; pleasures accrued in the pursuit of 
one's quarry are necessarily consumed by the · 
gravity of this urgent task: to make an exact 
representation of a species so as to insure against its 
disappear·ance. This endeavour would seem to have 
both spiritual and scientific import. 
Yet it seems to me each filmmaker is ultimate-
ly posed to suggest a triumph of human ingenuity 
over nonhuman nature. The lure of wildlife photo-
graphy and cinematography--its appeal to modern, 
humane sensibilities--is that it allows. a connois-
seur's relation to nature while simultaneously 
claiming not to exploit it. If the photographic fray 
is a disturbance-a penetration of the animal's 
habitat not unlike that of hunting--it is nevertheless 
ostensibly bloodless: a way of having our cake and 
eating it too, of possessing the animal arid perfilit-
ting its life to be spared. 
Wildlife _photographers and filmmakers seem 
innocent; . by contrast, hunters, and most particular-
ly trophy hunters, do not. Accordingly, while the 
hunting of animals has provoked much outrage 
throughout this century, wild animals may be held 
captive, given sulphuric ether, refrigerated, chased 
by motorized vehicles, treed by dogs, etc., all by 
photographers and cinematographers without a 
qualm; nesting locations may· be revealed without a 
thought. Yet, hunting and photography share much 
of the same terminology. We are reminded of this 
whenever we speak of "loading" and "aiming" a 
camera, or "sh.oo~ing" or "taking ~ snap~shot." 
Obviously, it is not by chance that the photo-
graphic act has often been compared with shooting, 
and the camera with the gun. 15 In her collection of 
essays on still photography, Susan Sontag suggests 
that people have switched from bullets to film as the 
fear of nature has been replaced with nostalgia: 
The hunters have Hasselblads instead of 
Winchesters; instead of looking through a 
telescopic sight to aim a rifle, they look through 
a viewfinder to frame a picture. In end-of-the-
century ·London, Samuel Butler complained that 
"there is a photographer in every bush, going 
about like a roaring lion seeking whom he may 
devour. • The photographer is now charging real 
beasts, beleaguered and too rare to kill. Guns 
have metamorphosed into cameras in this earnest 
comedy, the ecology safari, because nature has 
ceased to be what it always had been-what 
people needed protection from. ·Now nature--
tamed, endangered, mortal--needs to be protected 
from people. When we are afraid, we shoot. 
But when we are nostalgic, we take pictures." 
The desire to hunt trophies may be said to be 
the result of nostalgia and respect for the species. 
The larger, the more magnificent the species (and 
the rarer, I might add), the truer the match is said 
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to be with the human. It may also be the result of 
wanting to enter into communion with the environ-
ment, to return to a time when man was a hunter, 
a provider; to return to our "animal roots." This 
pleasure must be pursued in further and further 
away places, as more and more exotic animals are 
sought. 
And what prompts one to photograph wild-
life? What is this urge? The desire to photograph 
a wild ariimal may also be said to grow out of 
respect and affection for the species. Animals are 
beautiful and colourful; they are fitting subjects for 
the lens, out of the ordinary, naturally photogenic. 
The act may be prompted by the desire to be out of 
doors, to make a contribution to science, or as 
Richard Kearton put it, "to pit one's skill and 
ingenui~ against the shyness and cunning of a wild 
beast. " 1 In both instances the animal is taken from 
its world and made over into an image; it is opened 
up for future scrutiny, in another place, by another 
group of people, or perhaps by all of humankind 
when the species or phenomenon has ceased to 
exist. 
Significantly, the history of wildlife cinema-
tography and its progenitor, wildlife photography, 
is entwined with that of hunting. We can .find 
evidence of this in the titles of man·y of the early 
natural history photography texts--Photography 
for the Sportsman Naturalist (1904), How to 
Hunt with the Camera (1926). Stalking Birds 
with Color Camera (1951), etc. 18--and in the 
careers of many of the great museum collectors and 
wildlife filmmakers. To appr~ciate just how inti-
mate the. relationship between hunting with a rifle 
and hunting .with a camera is, we do well to read 
the numerous personal accounts that ,have been 
recorded by men who have performed both. 
"In past few years I have tried hunting and 
collecting," noted Herbert K. Job. in his 1905 ac-
count of his adventures as a "camera hunter," 
but this new 'hunting [with the camera] 
entirely outclasses them. It requires more 
skill than shooting, and hence is a finer 
sport. The results are of more int~rest and 
value, and, withal, the lives of the wild 
creatures are spared for our further 
pleasure. This hunting is in season the year 
round, every living thing IS proper •game; 
and the sport may be enjoyed by men and 
women alike. One may use both gun and 
camera, if desir~. In my own case, at first 
both were used, but, finding camera-hunting 
the more interesting and excitinr, I gradual-
ly lost the inclination to shoot.' 
Carl Akeley declared in 1923, "Camera hunting 
takes twice the man that gun hunting takes" --on the 
grounds that it required greater skill, daring, and 
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endurance.10 
Today, the sheer volume of published tales of 
near-fatal encounters between wildlife filmmakers 
and their "quarry" in the field provides ample 
evidence of the legacy of this predatory tradition in 
contemporary film practice. An article celebrating 
the 21st anniversary of Anglia' s wildlife series 
Survival catalogs the exploits of several film-
makers associated with this series: 
Alan Root had a hole torn in a leg by a hippo-
potamus and was also bitten by a leopard. John 
Buxton was nearly trampled by buffalo in north-
em Canada. Des and Jen Bartlett came close to 
drowning in the Amazon when their rubber boat 
was damaged and they were washed half a mile 
down river. Dieter Plage, a mercurial West 
German, was attacked by a crocodile which bit 
through his camera mounting, and has twice had . 
close encounters with charging elephants?• 
Wildlife filmmaker Wolfgang Bayer has conceded: 
"I am basically masochistic. . . . It's the chal-
lenge I enjoy--1t's toughness, overcoming circums-
tances. "22 
In the conventional split between "consump-
tive" and "non-consumptive" uses of wildlife, 
wildlife photography of course falls in the latter 
category (the animal's life is spared, afterall). But 
we must surely ask, what do we mean by non-
consumptive use? Is this not a contradiction in 
terms? Are we to assume that only the results are 
important? That the larg~Iy predatory pursuit of 
the animal is always understandable, justifiable--
even desirable--if the animal is not killed, if indeed 
we have a bloodless fr~y? · 
New Wilderness? 
A close look at the long-standing success 
stories of wildlife television would indicate that 
wildlife photography and filmmaking has to be 
constantly renewed with new frontiers--whether of 
species, behaviour, or technique--so as to engage 
the interest of the television audience in the nonhu-
man. From the microscopic daguerreotypes of the 
mid-nineteenth century, through the "flashlight" 
night images of the ·1920s and the underwater 
scenes of the 1950s, photography and its evolu-
tionary progeny, cinematography, have certainly 
lived up to (and surpassed) the promise made by 
American painter Samuel Morse upon seeing the 
first daguerreotypes in Paris in 1839: that the 
medium would offer the naturalist "a new kingdom 
to explore. "23 . 
Though many nature writers have not ceased 
to celebrate their relationship with the natural world 
first of all within the everyday and close to home, 
or to pin the great questions Of humankind in nature 
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on something as simple as the dilemma of a domes-
tic cat and a junco, wildlife photographers and, in 
particular, filmmakers, have known no such free-
dom from commercial demands. Driven to travel 
further and further away from home in order to 
pursue an ever receding horizon of "amazing 
creatures," or'· alternately, to get closer and closer 
to those species and natural processes near at hand, 
filmmakers in particular find themselves under 
pressure from two conflicting sets of expectatioi_ls: 
those arising from the desire of the audience to 
participate in the vicarious conquest of new realms 
of the nonhuman world (whether this be scenes 
never recorded on film before or scenes normally 
beyond the· naked eye) and those created by the 
need of these discourses for an idea or condition of 
wildness whose mythic proportions have not been 
diminished by this proliferation of images. 
Consider the sensation once created by 
motion picture recordings of even the most com-
monplace scenes in nature, as reported in the 
London Times of August 17, 1907: 
Entirely new possibilities in photography in 
nature study--one may say in field lore--
were revealed by Mr. Kearton yesterday 
before a small gathering at the haJJ of the 
Institute of Journalists. It has been known 
for sometime that [Richard Kearton] and his 
brother, whose photographs of birds are 
known all over the world, had been ex-
perimenting· with the bioscope . . . The 
results are astounding . . . The photo-
graphers have chiefly been busy with young 
broods ... You could follow every move-
ment of lhe bird: watch the bullfinches 
bring out the pouched food in surprising 
quantity: the larks run along their little 
pathway and carefully select each bird in 
turn. The waving of the grass, the ruffling 
of the feathers were quite distinct. The 
audience could not forbear a cheer when the 
sedge warbler, finding his mate on the nest, 
passed. on the fpod, which she in tum passed 
on to the young . ." .14 
The more our collection of such 
photographic evidence grows, the more difficult it 
becomes to elicit such a response. We compensate 
for this by searching even further abroad, substitut-
ing information or sensation for experience. The 
single human being today--be it wildlife painter, 
photographer or filmmaker--now stands most often 
not in relation to a local woodlot or other cherished 
spot, but to an entire continent, or even planet. 
Yet the dialectic of man and continent--rarely 
woman and continent--even man and planet, does 
not' dwarf the individual, as one might expect, but 
rather aggrandizes him. Listen to some of these 
titles of television series: The Undersea World 
of Jacques Cousteau; Mutual of Omaha's Wild 
Kingdom; Lorne Greene's New Wilderness. 
These are regions not of the world's body--her 
Volume 3, 1991 
rivers, landscapes, ecosystems, or even nation-
states--but rather territories of human mastery and 
subjugation: evidence _of our ~weeping vision. 
. . A final note: If I have been pessimistic here, 
It IS because the genre of the wildlife documentary 
~s we kno~ it !low has absorbed elements of escap-
Ism and scientism common to other practices, and 
is fraught with contradictions. For example, it may 
well be that even the flattened "whole earth" image, 
often featured in the title sequences of wildlife 
television documentaries confirms Portmann's dire 
prediction cited at the beginning of this piece. In 
an essay first published in the Whole Earth Re-
view, Yaakov Jerome Garb writes that behind this 
image which may commonly express the "beauty 
finiteness, fragility, and interconnected unity of th~ 
Earth," he finds instead "a banner of alienation and 
escape from the Earth." He calls it "a rearward 
view of a distant and abandoned Earth. "25 Indeed, 
in a recent television interview, wildlife filmmaker 
Wolfgang Bayer confessed his "ultimate dream" was 
to pursue his profession in outer space: "When 
there's going to be life up there, I would like to be 
the first one to document it. That would be nice. "26 
Notes· 
1. See Margot La Rocque, "Speaking Animals: Notes on the 
Human Voiceover in Wildlife Documentaries" in Undercur-
rents, Vol. 2, 1990, pp. 3-8. One crucial consequence of this 
legacy is the fact that in most programs the representation of 
the natural world appears unmcdiated by individual conscious-
ness. · 
2. Portmann is often cited by Neil Evernden in The Natural 
Alien: Humankind and Environment (Toronto:· University 
of Toronto Press, 1985). For a fuller discussion of the work 
and thought of Adolf Portmann, see Marjorie Grene's The 
Understanding of Nature, Vol. XXIII of Boston Studies in 
the Philosophy of Science (Dordrccht, Holland: D. Reidel 
Publishing Company, 1974).' Grene explains that Portmann's 
work hinges on the distinction between what he calls ·authen-
tic and inauthentic phenomena. Authentic phenomena are 
those patterns in space and time which appear to our senses, 
and inauthentic phenomena are those phenomena which would 
ordinarily be imperceptible to us, but which are increasingly 
mistaken for reality itself. 
3. See, for example, Bosley Crowther's review "Cousteau's 
The Silent World, • The New York Times, September 25, 
1956, reprinted in The Documentary Tradition ed. by Lewis 
Jacobs (2nd. ed.; New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
1979), pp. 316-17. . 
4. Adolf Portmann, "The Seeing Eye [1959), • in The Subvers-
ive Science: Essays Toward an Ecology of Man, ed. by Paul 
Shepard and Daniel McKinley (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1969), p. 121. Reprinted from Landscape, IX 
(Autumn, 1959), pp. 14-21. 
5. Lights Action Africa! 16mm, 60 mins., 1980, Survival 
Anglia. 
. 6. Lights Action Africa! All excerpts from this commentary 
Undercurrents 38 
have been transcribed by this author. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Ibid .. 
11 .. Thi.s is not, one surmises, accidental, for behind SI,!Ch 
statements lie some <>f the most complex theoretical questions 
~bout the nature of photographic and filinic representation. 
12. 2nd International Wildlife Film-Makers' Symposium, Bath 
University, England, September 23-27, 1981 
13. Although I was in attendance, I have taken this quote from 
a short piece entitled "Quotes from Bath ... , • The BKSTS 
Journal, 64:1 (January 1982), p. 7. 
14. I am thinking in particular of his series on the indigenous 
wildlife of Ireland. An excerpt from The Living Forest 
produced by R. T .E. was screened at the symposium at Bath. 
15. See Susan Sontag's On Photography (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 1977), pp.14-15, for a discussion of some 
of these metaphors, which Sontag claims are variants of the 
"inescapable metaphor" of the camera _as phallus. 
16. Sontag, p. 15. 
17. R. Kearton, Wild Life at Home: How to Study and 
Photograph It (London: Cassell and Company Limited, 
1898), p. viii. 
18. See. L.W. Brownell, Photography for the ~portsman 
NaturaliSt (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1904); 
William Nesbit, How to Hunt with the Camera: A Com-
plete Guide to all Forms of Outdoor Photography, (New 
York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1926); Arthur A. Allen, 
Stalking Birds with. Color Camera (Washington, D.C.: 
National Geographic Society, 1951. 
19. Herbert K. Job, Wild· Wings; adventures of a camera-
hunter among the larger wild birds of North America on 
sea and land (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, e. 
1905), pp. viii-ix; Carl E. Akeley, In Brightest Africa (New 
York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 192~). p. 155. Cited by 
Donna Haraway in Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and 
Nature. in the World of Modern Science (New York: 
Routledge, 1989), p. 43. 
21. "21 years of Survival" iii The BKSTS Journal, 63:9 
(September 1981), p. 568. 
22. Wolfgang Bayer, interviewed for The BKSTS Journal, 
63:9 (September 1981}, p. 581. 
23. Morse described the daguerreotype in a letter from Paris 
to the editor of the New York Observer, published on April 
20, 1839. He wrote: "The impressions of interior views are 
Rembrandt perfected. One of Mr. D.'s plates is an impression 
of a spider. The spi~er was not bigger than the head of a 
large pin, but the image, magnified by the solar microscope to 
the< size of the palm of the hand, having been impressed on the 
plate, and examined through a lens, was further magnified, and 
showed a minuteness of organization hitherto not seen to exist. 
You perceive how this discovery is, therefore, about to open 
a new field of research in the depths of microscopic Nature. 
We are soon to see if the minute has discoverable limits. The 
naturalist is to have a new kingdom to explore, as much 
beyond the microscope as the microscope is beyQnd the naked 
Volume 3, 1991 
eye. • Cited by Richard Rudisill in Mirror Image: The 
· Influence of the Daguerreotype on American Society 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1971), p. 45 
from letter reprinted in Samuel Irenaeus Prime's 'fhe Life of 
Samueal F.B. Mor~e (New York: . D. Appleton and Com-
pany, 1875), p. 401. 
24. London Times, August -17, 1907. Cited by Peter Steinhart 
in "Why do we watch Animal films?" (an address given at the 
3rd International Wildlife Film Festival, l.Jniversity of Mon-
tana, Missoula, March 1980). This address has been published 
in The BKSTS Journal, Vol. 63, No. 9 (Sept~mber 1981),. 
pp. 578-79 and p. 584. Steinhart · acknowledges Robert 
Dickson of U.C . .L.A. for supplying this quote. · 
Undercurrents 
25·. Yaakov Jerome Garb, "The Use and Misuse of the Whole 
Earth Image," Whole Earth Review, March 1985, pp. 18-
25. For another discussion of this theme, see Garb's .more 
· recent essay "Perspective or Escape? Ecofeminist Musings on· 
Contemporary Earth Imagery" in Reweaving the World: The 
Emergence of Ecofemi!}ism, edited by Irene Diamond and 
Gloria Feman Orenstein (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 
1990), pp. 264-78. 
26; Wolfgang Bayer, closing comment in televi::lion interview 
Wolfgang Bayer: Wildlife Cinematographer, produced by 
KRMA-TV, Denver, 1986. 
Volume 3, 1991 
P·. 
L 
A 
c 
E 
by Ann Howatt Krahn* 
Place? 
To ask wets tap-roots keen for water. 
Its people say "The Island", Grand Tracadie on its Atlantic Shore. 
And naming it, I am there, pulled by the gravity of glacial quartz and native 
sandstone, merging with my watery ancestors, swimming among our salty selves. 
Horizons are. illusions, vast and boundless; the mind empties. And in the dunes, the 
stillness is not really still; for when I see, every small thing is in some movement, 
some oscillation; the energy radiates, warm on the cloudiest of days. Nor is the silence· 
really silent, especially in .the long grass of the Fox Hills ... where still eyes, once 
engaged, are enigmas, deep in all directions. 
The night sky positively hums; and then lies br~athless. And when it arches to the 
dragon's thunder, the stars shake. 
Its marsh in spring is damp and· greenly wild; singing in the hawk's shadow-
wheeling in the warmth of summer--weighted with the scent of spruce and bayleaf. 
And in the moon-high tides of autumn storms, the dune grass, wet and blond, drums 
like wings agains~ the hills. While the winds chant for winter, and the ancient songs 
of water under ice. · 
This island lives within me. Its tides are mine. 
I know this Inside Place as My Island-
a space edgeless, fathomless, drawn in mystery. It is compelling, intense, yet 
infinitely still, knowing, somehow, before I do: There are wonders there, which I can't 
imagine. · This place absorbs each joy and· sorrow, and accepts those of my ancestors. 
This boundless, inside place is My Island; it travels with me; it celebrates all 
wonders and re-cognizes all pain. It listens to the unacceptable; and w.hen there is 
healing, it is sanctuary. 
My Island woke to midnight chanting in Alexandria; it rose on the incense of Japan; it 
tasted the growing things· of Bali. My Island goes everywhere, yet it ~tays home. Yes, I 
sense that it has been everywhere before me--that it knows its world, and this place is 
vast and deep. 
Water bright and shadow black, blood beating in the ocean 
Is this Island. 
"Ann Howatt Krahn is conducting graduate research in environmental thought from ihe perspectives of psychology and material 
culzure. 
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The Dog and the Wolf: 
Some Thoughts On Biological Shackles and. the Trap of Humanism 
by Craig Naherniak· 
Discouraged af~er an unsuccessful day of hunting, a hungry Wolf came on 
a well-fed Mastiff. He could see that the Dog was having a better time of it than he 
·was and he inquired what the Dog had to do to stay so well fed. "Very little," said 
the Dog. "Just drive away beggars, guard the house, show fondness to the master, 
be submissive to the rest of the family and you are well fed and warmly lodged." 
The Wolf thought this over carefully. He risked his own life almost daily, 
had to stay out in the worst of weather, and was never assured of his meals .. He 
thought he would try another way of living. 
As they were going along together the Wolf saw a place around the Dog's. 
neck where the hair had worn thin. He asked what this was and the Dog said it was 
nothing, "just the place where my collar and chain rub." The Wolf stopped short. 
"Chain?" he asked. "You me.an you are not free to go where you choose?" "No," 
said the Dog, "but what does that mean?" "Much," answered the Wolf as he trotted 
off. "Much." 1 
There are many different themes running through 
this Aesop fable which are applicable to trends in 
Western culture. One way to interpret this piece 
is to think of the Wolf as representing . "wildness" 
and the Dog as representing "domestication. "2 The 
collar and chain that rub around the neck of the 
Dog are like our own tie to the , Western techno-
. logical mind-set. It _appears that the Dog is living 
a comfortable, safe, easy life, just as we feel that 
the benefits of our technological world have brought 
us a similar security. The Wolf, i~ choosing not to 
accept the collar and chain of the Dog, maintains 
the freedom to follow . his own will and purpose. 
He retains his wildness. The Dog has had this 
wHdness, this independent purpose, bred out of him 
by the Master. His purpose is not his own, but that 
of the Master. We, in Western culture, tend to see 
ourselves as like the Master, possessing control 
over what purpose the rest of nature will serve for 
us. We fail to recognize that, nature, like the 
Wolf, has purpose independent from us. We also 
fail to recognize that ·the very mechanisms and 
techniques which we . use to exert control, have 
placed us in the position, not of Master, but of the 
Dog. The trap of .humanism, therefore, is that in 
attemptin~ to domesticate nature, we domesticate 
ourselves. · 
Wildness is everything opposite to what we 
consider civilization: it is the untamed, the 
undomesticated and that which is not controlled. In 
this sense, wildness is understood as the absence of 
human control. A wild animal is a creature with its 
own intrinsic volition, beyond any humanly defined 
purpose. While wild animals have come to sym-
bolize such human qualities as freedom, innocence 
and courage, it is important to recognize that 
wildness is also part of our biological heritage. 
Humans, too, have sprung from the. spontaneous 
integration of genetic information that forms new 
unique beings, and which characterizes . wildness . 
The constant change, through reproduction, in a 
constantly changing environment is what provides 
both the diversity and the stability of all life forms 
on the planet.. In other words, despite our culture's 
tendency to see humans as different and separate 
from wild nature, . we are continuous with it. 
From our poshion of perceived separation from 
riature, we extol 'the virtues of freedom arid 
independence associated with wildness. Yet at a 
cultural level, to ensure our survival we seem to 
have been working on ways . to minimize risk and 
extend control over society, and ourselves. Writer 
and naturalist John A. Livingston has described the 
development of this mechanism of control as a 
cultural "domestication" process. 
It .is Livingston's contention that long before 
we began t9 physically domesticate plants and 
animals, humans had alr~ady become ps-ychological-
ly domesticated through technological dependence 
and the cultivation of sophisticated techniques of 
social control, in the form of rituals, customs, 
regulations, and codes of varying description.• To 
sustain control over our lives and our growing 
' Craig Naherniak is completing his Master in Environmental Studies at York Universily where he is explcring environmental thought. 
Upon graduation he expects to spend more of his rime being in nature and less time writing abouJ it. 
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populations, we gave up the biological mechanisms 
of social regulation which still characterize the rest 
of nature. We suppressed our wildness and 
replaced it with techniques of social management. 
By doing so, Livingston argues, we were "forced to 
suspend (and eventually forgot altoge~er) the 
mutualistic non-competitive, peaceful social order 
from which [humans] had come. "5 The techniques 
humans developed for maintaining social control 
became the very fabric out of which civilization was 
woven. 
· Simplified as this accoun~ may be,. in retr:o-
spect we can easily see the mcrease m human 
dependence on technology, accompanied by the 
deepening · of the perceived separation between 
humans and the rest of the natural world. This has 
not occurred to the same degree in all human 
cultures, but is presently epitomized by ind~strial 
societies. According to Abbe Mowshowitz, a 
computer science professor from the University of 
British Columbia, . our human dependence on 
technology has led t? technology bec~.mi~g the 
mediator of all expenence. He says: It IS not 
simply the use of machine~ and gadgets th~t defines 
this dependence. Our reliance on them IS merely 
the outward manifestation of a pervasive attitude 
toward experience. 116 All experience, he believes, 
has become a commodity. He says, "the ability to 
grasp what i~ real is a~tenuated by th~ interposi~ion 
of interpretive media, by excessive filtenng, 
blocking, and laundering of experience. To the 
extent that we inhibit the capacity to interact with 
the world on a direct basis, we risk a one-sided and · 
faulty vi~w of reality and ultimately bec~me 
maladaptive. "7 Technology becomes not JUSt 
something we use for survival, but becomes 
technique--a mind-set for looking at and interpreting 
the world (like a pair of coloured glasses). 
Mowshowitz uses examples· from science 
fiction to demonstrate both the consequences of 
human technological dependence, and the "inherent 
contradiction in the conquering spirit ofscience and 
technology. "8 His conclusion is that in extending 
our dominion over the natural world we have 
alienated ourselves from the sources of our own 
vitality. "Through obsessive exercise of the will to 
power in the elaboration of technique,~ he says, 
"will itself became enfeebled and subject to control 
by autonomous forces link~d to me~ha~ical pr?g-
ress .... A social order built of this 1mperat1ve 
ultimately domesticates the heroiC impulse. which 
fashions it. "9 In other words, by creatmg an 
elaborate technological infrastructure aimed at 
making humans more free (to enjoy life), we have 
paradoxically ended up becoming enslaved by this 
technological miild;.;set. The result is less freedom 
of will and more centralization of control. But, 
does the control we humans like to think .we have 
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really exist? Christopher Hodder-Williams, author 
of Fistful of Digits,. thinks not: 
Eventually the mechanical interlock of technology 
must conquer. all individual will. You might 
conceivably postpone it, but it could only be 
postponement, because for as long as ~an cou.ld 
not stand by himself and rely on h1mself m 
preference to the easy way out, then inevitably he 
would wind up handing over the mastery of his 
own wits ... [~ic] 10 
Though Hodder-Williams does not directly· say so, 
he hints that the domestication of humans through 
dependence on technology and . social order event-
ually causes th~ loss of individual will, whic.h. is the 
one thing the so-called control and stability of 
technological society were supposed to grant us. 
For the sake of comfort and security the Dog 
gave up its ·own will to that of its master. So too, 
we give up our will to that of the cult~r~l techn.o-
logical machine we have created. .BY ~1vmg up It.s 
will and independence, the Dog relinquishes purs?It 
of its own teleology. (In the case of the Dog, Its 
teleology has been relinquished biologicall~, 
through breeding.) Its teleology, or purpose, ts 
now that of the Master. .In a way, the Dog be-
comes a technology whose purpose is to guard the 
house and show fondness to its Master. 
If we can associate the loss of will to the 
surrendering of purpose, then the next questio~ is, 
what is purpose? And, where do.es purpose reside? 
I will avoid discussing the possibility of purpose on 
a cosmic level. That there exists some omnipotent 
entity predetermining evolutionary direction can not 
be supported beyond faith. Job~ Livin~sto~ su~­
gests that there is no "purpose of this kmd m 
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· nature--at least no purpose that humans are capable 
of knowing. He suggests that "random genetic and 
environmental events brought us to a stage at which 
our minds, and thus our cultures took over, "11 and 
that prior to this all change was accidental and 
random. 
Another way to think of purpose is at the level 
of the individual, where it can be thought of as 
residing in all beings--at least in the sense that each 
organism has its own teleology, whether it is 
conscious of it or not. Paul Taylor, in Respect for 
Nature, reaffirms the idea that each individual 
.organism has its own purpose (which can be as 
simple as sustaining life): 
We conceive of the organism as a teleological 
centre of life, striving to preserve itself and 
realize its good in its own unique way. To say 
it is a teleological centre of life is to say that its 
internal functioning as well as its external 
activities are all goal orientated, having the 
constant tendency to maintain the organism's 
existence through time and to enable it success-
fully to perform those biological operations 
whe.reby it . reproduces its kind. and continually 
adapts to changing envil:onmental events and 
conditions. 12 
Every Jiving thing has being in and of itself. 
In this sense, it has purpose. Its purpose is in-
herent in its being, otherwise it would not be here, 
in nature--the conglomeration of everything being. 
There is no need for humans to know and under-
stand purpose for it to exist. However, not know-
ing is irritating to .the Western rationalist who, by 
cultural tradition, feels compelled to equate all 
purpose in tenps of human use value. The pur-
pose-to-humans-only view is what prevails in pres-
ent society. 
Hans Jonas, in The Imperative of Responsi-
bility, discusses the same topic of individual pur-
pose by showing the effects of having purpose 
reside solely in humans.13 His discussion of the 
way humans try to control the elements of nature to 
fashion technologies or tools for their pwn use 
helps illustrate the humanistic .ideology that per-
meates our conception of purpose. The end or 
purpose of a tool (or machine) belongs, Jonas 
argues, to the concept of the tool, and this con-
cept, as with all artifacts, preceded the tool's 
existence and is the cause of its origination. The 
tool, a hammer in Jonas' example, does not have a 
purpose in and of itself. The concept of .what a 
hammer might be underlies the object itself. The 
hammer did not exist before the concept of the 
hammer existed. The concept of time measure-
ment, for example, was the inspiration for the 
clock, and the clock is totally defined by this end. 
It is its only reason for being. The end of the clock 
is not, however, located in the clock, but in it's 
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maker, and this is also true of· any machine. 
Neither the hammer nor the clock have any purpose 
in and of themselves; their purpose is only in their 
use within a particular cultural context. And so it 
is true for all lifeless implements of human manu-
facture. These implements can be anything from 
simple tools to abstract institutions. Both the tool 
and the institution are artifacts created to serve the 
maker's purpose. 
Even nature, as a whole, is made over as an 
institution in the Western mind. The same 
reasoning we use to Greate social institutions we 
apply to nature in deciding what the intended use of 
the non-human is. With nature, we analyze the 
physical appearance and interpret a use for us. We 
·see nature's purpose as providing us with resources 
and we develop a set of processes for the use of 
them. Stripped of its own being, nature becomes 
thought of as II our environment. II It is considered 
an II institution," which has its use defined by our 
purposeful desires. The ramifications of this 
egocentric view are growing now that genetic 
engineering has brought our technological society to 
the threshold of controlling all life processes. 
Over the centuries, the one level the human 
domestication process could not touch was that of 
the genes. Reproduction, the way living things 
transmit genetic information from one generation to 
the next, has always been the only way new life 
forms could emerge. The random genetic fluctu-
ations in the offspring further ensures that change 
--the one constant of all life--continues!4 This 
evolutionary process is extremely slow however, 
and evolution does not always create the kind of life 
forms humans find useful; therefore, we have 
learned to control nature with .selective breeding. 
While yielding predictable results,. selective 
breeding has limitations. There still remains room 
for random natural mutation. Also, selective 
breeding is limited by the natural limit of the range 
of variation within a particular species beyond 
which severely mutated offspring cannot survive. 
Further, we always had to wait until the offspring 
were born, or sprouted, before we would know if 
the trait bred for was indeed passed on. 
Now, the human practice of genetic engineer-
ing has the potential to remove the randomness of 
genetic changes. In place of randomness, genetic 
engineering promises exact predictability and 
control of the genetic structure of life forms, by 
manipulating their DNA. Geneticist David Suzuki 
explains that: 
Until now, the power to determine the fate of 
individual genes in living things has, with rare 
exceptions, resided in nature. Evolution tends to 
rid populations of orga·nisms possessing 
detrimental genetic traits at a ponderously slow 
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pace. But today we are rapidly assembling the 
technological tools not only to render quick 
judgments concerning the "genetic worth • of 
DNA sequences ·but also to impose those 
judgments by modifying the information stored in 
genetic molecules.15 
By altering the DNA of an individual life form, 
whether by selective breeding or genetic engi-
neering, the individual's teleology can be altered at 
the organism's genetic structural level and replaced 
with human purpose. The science of genetic engi-
neering simply takes the guess work out· of 
domesticati'on. 
The idea that d-omestication makes nature into 
technologies to be used for human purpose becomes 
realized literally through genetic engineering. An 
organism's very essence, ·its DNA, cannot only be 
altered, but engineered to our exacting specifica-
tions. Through the process of cloning, for 
example, we are now able to take a cell from a 
microorganism, couple it with another piece of 
DNA, insert this cell into a host animal so that it 
will propagate, and "harvest" the cloned enzymes 
that are produced. In this way, organisms acquire 
novel genetic properties that would not be attainable 
through conventional breeding or natural mutation. 
Other possibilities include using the stomachs of 
animals to manufacture chemicals or drugs in 
quantities previously unheard of. In an .article 
entitled "Transgenic Animals Make Drugs in their 
Milk," Andrew Pollack describes this undertaking: 
Scientists are reporting their first successes in 
genetically transforming animals so that they can 
produce drugs and other useful substances in 
their mill<. Although in the early stages of 
development, it could one day turn farm animals 
into living factories, producing pharmaceuticals, 
industrial enzymes and food additives.16 
This proces·s effectively turns the cow into a living 
machine whose sole purpose is to produce drugs for 
humans. 
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The biotechnology company, Integrated Gen-
etics Inc., is bioengineering mice so that their milk 
contains a drug useful in treating human heart 
problems. Likewise, researchers in Edinburgh are 
inserting into sheep the genes needed for the pro-
duction of two human proteins that could be used as 
drugs for the treatment of human diseases. The 
advantages of having animals produce th_ese sub-
stances is that costs are substantially reduced. As 
one biologist remarks, "What is your input: grass 
and hay." Also, if more of the substance is needed, 
. then it is simply a matter of breeding more ani-
mals, 17 of essentially building more machines. 
As the science of genetic engineering becomes 
perfected, more and more complex substances can 
be produced in anima~s for human use. This type 
of "molecular farming" is just one of the ways 
applied genetic engineering is being realized. 
Another aspect of genetic engineering is the cre-
ation of entirely new creatures that are genetic 
recombinations of creatures that would normally be 
unable to reproduce naturally. One example is the 
"geep," a combination of a goat and a sheep.18 
These new life forms can even be patented like any 
other new "technologies." 
One of the next applications of genetic 
engineering will likely be the removal of "negative" 
traits in humans. Currently, genetic engineers are 
mapping the human DNA in order to discover 
which particular gene regulates which specific 
trait. 19 What is at stake may, however, be more 
than just the ethical considerations sur-rounding the 
decision of what is a "negative" or "positive" trait. 
If and when we begin to apply technological prac~ 
tices to the formation of the human we will have 
crossed a line that has never been traversed before. 
If we understand engineering to· mean the designing 
and constructing of complex material artifacts for 
human use, including the redesigning of existing 
designs for adaptation or improvement, then 
applying engineering techniques to the human 
genetic code means turning humans into the same 
category of artifact (that we reduce the non-human 
world to). Thus, everything in the world becomes 
an artifact, an object. This, Jonas argues, makes 
the human subject, not a means, but "a thing merely 
to be acted upon. "20 Human evolutionary change 
then becomes determined not by the chance integra-
tion of genetic traits (governed by adaptive 
mechanisms rooted in relationship with nature), but 
rather by the direct physical intervention of humans 
whose understanding of what traits are desirable or 
undesirable is rooted in a narrow, culturally fabri-
cated understanding of the place of humans in · 
nature. In other words, future humans become 
artifacts whose purpose resides in past generations. 
We in Western society maintain a view that 
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humans are the subjects and "nature" is the object 
of our technological mastery. In this view. humans 
are the mediators, the appliers, the purposeful 
linkers of technology onto nature in order for the 
non-human to serve our ends. Humans are ethically 
out of bounds for technological manipulation 
because they are considered to have purpose of their 
own. Western society has always considered there 
to be a clear division between humans and 
technology, or artifacts. Now that the science of 
genetic engineering has made it theoreticaJJy 
possible for technological application to be· applied 
to humans, this may change. 
Right now we have a sense of belonging to a 
humanity in which we see all purpose residing. 
But, after several generations of engineered humans 
--that is, humans with pre-determined characteris-
tics--where will the goal or realm of purpose lie? 
It seems that purpose will be defined forever by the 
previous generation and there will be no opportunity 
for adaptation from these pre-ordained characteris-
tics, since the unique potential of each person will 
have been limited. The random genetic fluctuations 
that Livingston maintains are the one constant of all 
life will have been removed. Humans will have 
become domesticated, not just culturaJJy, but very 
possibly, physically as well. Our "collar and 
chain" will be engineered right in. The possibility 
of engineering social control in humans will become 
reality. 
If, as Livingston maintains, human history is 
one of furthering the domestication process in order 
to preserve social control, then genetic engineering 
is the final solution to the unpredictability and 
irrationality of all nature. In the process, humans 
will have become a product of the same technologi-
cal applications that we enact on nature. There will 
no longer be any "wildness~ within or without (nor 
will there be any "Wolf" to remind us of what has 
been lost). At least this is the direction we are 
headed if we take the domestication process to its 
logical conclusion. The biggest proof that our 
assumptions about human control are flawed is that 
they are self-defeating. Instead of technology being 
used to free humans, it will have imprisoned 
humans within a biological ·heritage designed by 
previous generations, and hence the domestication 
process will have been completed. 
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Toward an Original Forestry 
by rolf strutherl 
A Moment (A Release). 
On a day in early spring, I was sitting on a small hummock eating lunch, enjoying the warmth of the 
spring sun and relieving my legs after a good, long walk in the Woods when it happened. It takes a while, it 
never happens right away but sometimes, after hours of walking, thinking, and feeling my way along the paths 
of the Woods, it can happen. The wall drops and conversation begins. I breathe in fresh spring air and I feel 
my blood go rushing through me in a flood of exhilaration. "LIVE, BREATHE, AWAKEN" the Woods say, 
"Let us begin again." The ground, the smell of fresh rotting leaves, the sound of the trickling water, the hum 
of the first bumblebee in the nearby leaves, the unhurried wadness of the wolf spider hunting in the leaf mold, 
the up-shooting lush green of the trilliums and other wood spring flowers--all these things create a rhythm. 
I feel the rhythm coursing through me; I feel like I too am being renewed. I leap up and caper around briefly, 
then stop. 
And the moment is gone. 
But it is not completely gone. Many times now I have re-called that moment, and I am there. I and the 
Woods are speaking, the Woods saying LIFE and I exclaiming yes! here, life dig, root, push, lift, spread! The 
rhythm of spring e_choes in my ears and fills my nose with its vibrant odour. 
This literary passage takes us along a way 
toward an original forestry. When we say "origin-
al," we mean a forestry that returns to its origins 
and then turns out into its own pathway. In this 
essay I try to speak with language that reminds us 
of the textuality of the text, breaking up words or 
bringing words together to remind us of their 
contextual origins and their origins-in-the-world, 
that is, the origins of language in nature and our 
shared experience. 
This venture begins on woodpaths in the 
Backus Woods, an old-growth Carolinian forest in 
Southern Ontario. It has recently been the centre of 
an environmental controversy, which resulted in the 
Woods becoming an "Area of Natural and Scientific 
Interest." 1 
The Backus Woods' existence is intertwined 
with the forces of Western history, that is, with the 
questions of modern forestry management and the 
questions of modern Western conservation and thus 
Western environmental thought. 
The Woods is now dependent upon the sway 
of modern Western technology and representational 
thinking. The sway of modern Western technology . 
is an expression, translated from the thought of 
Martin Heidegger, which describes an underlying 
force within modern Western forestry and indeed all 
facets of modern Western life.2 This paper intends 
to openly thinl2 on the way in which represent-
ational thinking and the drive of modern technology 
entraps modern Western forestry and forest con-
servation into devastating and disruptive relation-
ships with forests. To think openly on the matter 
of an original forestry asks us to step back from our 
assumptions concerning modern forestry and 
modern forest conservation and think openly on the 
matter at hand--forestry. In venturing into this 
confrontation I have relied on the helpful work of 
Martin Heidegger, particularily the texts: What is 
Called Thinking?4 and The Question Concerning 
Technology. 5 
Let us get underway by meditating on this 
passage from Martin Heidegger. 
The forester who, in the wood, measures the 
felled timber and to all appearances walks 
the same forest path in the same way as did 
his grandfather is today commanded by 
profit-making in the lumber industry, 
whether he knows it or not. He is made 
subordinate to the orderability of cellulose, 
which for its part is challenged forth by the 
need for paper, which is then delivered to 
newspapers and illustrated magazines~ 
Habitually we think the forester is bidden by the 
forest industry to "improve" natural deciduous 
woodlands with forest management techniques. The 
lumber industry is bidden by the profit-motive to 
make an ever greater profit from the sale of forest 
timber; thus it puts ever-increasing pressure on 
forest lands to produce timber more quickly. It is 
commanded by the drive for ever-increasing profits. 
rolf struthers completed his Masters in Environmental Studies in 1989. On the way he wrote "Toward an Original (Alternative) 
Forestry• an exploration of the metaphysical and representational roots of modem forestry. He would like to thank Neil Evernden, John 
Livingston and Sam Mallin for their help with the original draft. He would like to thank the members of the Editorial Board for their help 
with this draft. He would also like to thank Andrea. Currently, whenever the opportunity presents itself, he can be found wandering in 
Carolinian forests. 
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Lumber companies and pulp arid paper companies, 
small or large, are no longer secure as long as they 
are profitable in comparison to the average profits 
made in the forest industry. Profit-making is 
measured internationally by the ability of investors 
to make profits in any particular industry. Thus, if 
· gold mining is more profitable than lumber, then 
investors will invest in gold mining. Those that 
invest in the forest industry expect the same rate of 
return as if they had invested in gold mining and so 
drive the forest industry to increase its profitability 
in order to secure and increase the investments of 
.its investors. This profit-making itself should not 
be understood, however, to be controlled by in-
vestors . .Investors are themselves driven by profit-
making to invest in the most profitable industry. If 
they do not invest in the most profitable industries, 
then they will be overtaken by those who do invest 
in the most profitable industries. Investors can only 
store their profits in the most profit-making indus-
tries to remain themselves profit-makers. Thus, 
investors are made subordinate by the drive of 
profit-making in the forest industry as in every 
industrial investment possibility which is itself 
subordinate to global industrial investment possibil-
ities. 
In the same way, profit-making in the lumber 
industry makes the forester "subordinate to the 
orderability of cellulose." That is, the forester 
finds that the most productive .and efficient means 
of producing wood fibre, whether for lumber or 
pulp and paper, are silvicultural techniques that are 
themselves the embodiment of our modern 
ecological and representational understanding of the 
forest. Let us turn to the forester's ecological and 
representational way of thinking of the forest.7 
As we walk south along the centre path in the 
Woods we encounter stands of red pine and mixed 
stands of red and white pine. These plantation 
stands embody the challenging drive of profit-
making in the forest. Red pine and white pine are 
valuable tree species useful to humans. They are 
planted in rows, thinned and pruned. In this way 
the forester orders the forest and commands the 
forest, challenging forth the lumber or pulp chips 
he needs to supply the forest industry's sawmills 
and pulp and paper mills. Often the forester cannot 
wait for the trees to grow naturally, so fertilizers8 
are applied to challenge the trees to ·even greater 
growth and to compensate for soils that have been 
exhausted by previous silvicultural or agricultural 
stress. As well the forester cannot allow 
undesirable tree and shrub species to slow the 
growth of those. trees he has under his command, so 
he applies herbicides9 to destroy these 
"competitors." The forester also cannot allow the 
death of his profit-making trees through disease so 
he applies fungicides 10 to destroy viruses and fungal 
tree diseases. He cannot afford the loss of crop 
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trees through insect infestations and depredations so 
he applies insecticides. 11 In this way, the forester 
commands the forest to supply trees for the forest 
industry. The red and white pmes before us are the 
embodiment of "the orderability of cellulose· to 
which the forester is made subordinate, whether he 
knows it or not. In this way forests are being set 
by the forester into what Heidegger calls a 
"standing reserve." · 
Thus, even as a forest preserve, Backus 
Woods is part of the carved up mosaic for modern 
forestry of lands that are in one way or another 
standing reserve. Though most of these lands are 
not on reserve for the forest industry, every piece 
of land is categorized in terms of its possible 
usefulness or use-less-ness to the forest industry: its 
current reserve status or its ability to be put on 
reserve (its capability in terms of soils, drainage 
and physical features to support valuable forest 
species). · 
This challenging forth is not limited to the 
forester. In the same way, the scientist, 
environmental educator and naturalist fall into the 
trap of approaching the forest as "objects of 
research," (i.e. representations: ·names, diagrams, 
collections, vegetation~! inventories, etc.) or as "a 
living tree museum. "12 These are the records of the 
standing reserve. In order to ascertain the presence 
of an object, the researcher does not need to 
actually find the object in the forest but only make 
an observation of it in the inventory (the list of the 
standing reserve). We no longer need to actually 
visit the Woods to ascertain what is in it, we can 
consult an inventory. . Thus we believe, in some 
sense that the inventory--the abstract collection of 
objects in the forest--is more desirable and useful 
than a visit to the Woods with all the variable and 
incidental inaccuracies that may arise from such a 
visit. The scientist is commanded by his science to 
yield up objective knowledge of the forest, while 
the forest is challenged by scientists seeking the 
forest's objective knowledge. The conservationist 
is commanded by the representational science of 
conservation to yield up scientific proof that the 
forest is a rare and representative Carolinian forest, 
while the forest is challenged to yield up rare and 
representative fauna and flora (plants and animals). 
The proof of the importance of scientific 
conservation. is revealed in the Backus controversy 
where scientific conservationists arguing on the 
basis of the need for scientific research in old-
growth forests and the rare collections of species 
and species communities played an important role in 
conservationists' arguments for the preservation of 
the Woods. 
This is the danger, the Danger, that 
accompanies us on our walk, in our venture, but 
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which we are -only now able to articulate in a way 
that we can begin to attend to. The·Danger is the 
grasping, driving, challenging forth of the forest to 
yield up its gifts: lumber, pulp, firewood, shade, 
nuts, fruits, syrup, resins and sap, medicaments, 
scientific ·knowledge, rare species, conservation 
challenges and sacred groves. The Danger to the 
essence of the Woods is that we will only think of 
the Woods as a list, an inventory, or a tree 
museum. 
. The Danger stems from what we have called 
representational thinking. This · thinking is driven 
by what we might call the drive of the ·modern 
technology of the West; we must not however, 
mistake this technology for something technological, 
for it itself is not a tool or machine or technique. 
The interwoven links · between .the Danger, 
representational thinking and Western technology 
are revealed not just by the Woods itself but also by 
the old Backhouse waterwheels and the new Backus 
Heritage Conservation Area "Nature Trail" 
pathway. 
The Backhouse waterwheel sits at the end· of 
the flume that brings water from the dammed pond 
into which-the Dedrich Creek flows. It is presently 
a wooden, overshot wheel similar to the one John 
Backhouse originally used. The mill, before it was 
bought by the Long Point Region Conservation 
Authority (LPRCA), had a turbine at the bottom of 
a ten foot well!3 The mill also had, at that time, a . 
natural gas engine which could be .hooked up to the 
main drive shaft of the mill, and the water wheel 
disengaged, if the water level was too low. . The 
dam places the water of the Creek "on call" and 
ready for use. The natural gas engine is similarly 
on call as is the mill itself: its belts and buckets, 
grinders, baggers, rollers, sifters and the grains 
stored in bins, ready to be ground and sold as 
animal feed, flour for baking, oats for cooking, etc. 
Thus the dammed water of the Creek and all 
the materials and machinery of the mill are placed 
on reserve, in other words, on call for the making 
of grain products. I:Iowever in order for the Creek 
to be dammed up there first must be the thinking 
that thinks of the water as an object that can be 
stored up in readiness for the use of a grist mill. 
This thinking would also see the forest as "ready-
to-hand; .. .~ 4 objects ready to be sawn into timber for 
export to Great Britain and the eastern United States 
and to build the sawmill, gristmill, local housing, 
harbour facilities, canal systems and fortifications. 
This thinking would also see the forest as . a supply 
of nuts, sap, etc. The technology involved in . 
thinking of the water mill is a way of thinking that 
does not as yet show itself fully. According to our 
modern way of thinking the mill is now inefficient. 
The mill dam is insufficient; it cannot always 
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guarantee "peak" production--in ·fact, . it cannot 
guarantee any production at all. When the water 
is low in the Creek, sufficient power to drive the 
mill is unavailable. We could say the dam does not 
gather the w~ter together in a way that.successfully 
challenges the Creek to be orderly and supply the 
Backhouse mill continuously. 
It is because the Backus grist mill, 
waterwheel and dam cannot produce at all times, 
that the mill has passed out of use and become a 
curiosity piece. ·It is a thing that still stands for 
tourists to poke through, though its · t.hinglinesg5 is 
ended. The mill is now a piece of Ontario's 
heritage: . "a resource of antiquity." Thus it has 
been successfully put into the standing reserve of 
. this age as a part of the Backus Heritage 
Conservation Area. The mill has therefore become 
part of the standing reserve but not as the thing that 
it was but as a .thing which has had a new 
determination of its thingliness attached to it as 
Ontario's heritage. 
The Backus mill, homestead and former 
woodlands (now the Backus Conservation Area and 
· The Backus Woods, respectively), are joined into 
the larger history of Upper Canada. As well, the 
mill and homestead were constructed because of the 
historical movement that has placed the Woods into 
the context of Western history ! 6 . 
Backus Woods lies in the path of Western 
history as is shown by recent improvements to the 
"Nature Trail" in the Backus Heritage·Conservation 
Area. This nature trail was widened and flattened 
last summer. It appears the LPRCA used a 
bulldozer. A bulldozer is a good symbol of the 
progress of the technology of the West. This 
particular bulldozer gouged ·out a broad, flat 
pathway from the mill pond up to the third 
concession. What was a small footpath that made 
its way along the banks of the Dedrich Creek up to 
the third concession and over along the Dedrich 
floodplain path, is now a large muddy ·walkway 
wide enough for trucks. The bulldozer tore up and 
smashed the roots of trees along the high side of the 
path leaving a scar of broken roots ~nd exposing the 
sub-soil which is now eroding into the pathway. It 
pushed the soil it had torn up from the high side, 
down onto the lower creekside covering up the 
trunks of trees. Two magnificent white ashes, their 
trunk~ now a foot deep in subsoil, stretch their arms 
out over the Creek. A sign beside them identifies 
them as white ash--Fraxinus americana. Will the 
ashes survive? · Trees react very poorly to such 
changes. It is ·likely that the bulldozer broke or 
damaged many of the twin ashes' roots. Thus 
weakened, the ashes may experience root rot and 
other root diseases. However, it is because their 
trunks have been buried that the twin ashes 
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probably will not survive. Many trees are very 
resilient to change and some trees are unaffected by 
fluctuating soil levels (for example floodplain tree 
species). However most tree species will die if 
their trunks are covered with soil forty centimetres 
or more from the base of the trunk. Other trees 
principal roots were cut by the bulldozer blade) 
have now been sawn up and their trunks removed. 
The pathway is now broad and even, making it 
easily accessible. But the cost of this easy access is 
the life of trees, ironically, in a conservation area. 
have died and may die from the work of the Should we be surprised to see that, in a 
bulldozer. This summer, while walking along this conservation area, the improvements to a nature 
path by the Creek, I noticed that three trees (which trail actually harm those beings they are trying to 
·had previously fallen into the Creek because their conserve? It is the over-arching and over-whelming 
Undercurrents 
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use a bulldozer to "improve" 
the nature trail. The path 
the bulldozer makes is the 
kind of path we most often 
find ourselves wal.king on in 
this age--a path that is 
gouged out, paved over and 
marked off with signs every-
where: turn right, turn left, 
bathrooms this way, three 
kilometres to go, no motor-
bikes allowed,· etc. The 
most obvious of these, such 
as the now bulldozed, 
. widened and flattened path, 
display our representational 
distance from trees and 
therefore break their roots 
and cover up their trunks 
without care and without 
understanding. The bull-
dozed path shows up the 
way we think in this age in 
the way it flattens out and 
controls everything in its 
path before it may happen. 
We seek to prevent the kind 
of interference a natural path 
might cause. And we seek 
to prevent it from reminding 
us that it is a natu~al path 
through the Wood that bends · 
our way and that bends to 
our walking way. We can 
see good examples of these 
two ways at work in animal 
paths that make their way 
through the Woods. The 
bulldozer path seeks. to 
control the way the path 
moves through the forest: it 
maintains the path by mov-
ing dirt into areas where the 
Creek threatens to pull the 
path down and it controls . 
obstructions by cutting trees 
and branches out of the way 
and removing ·uncertain 
inclines and downward 
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